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ABSTRACT
Development of new technology is critical to the growth and success of technology-
driven companies. New technology is generated in a number of ways, one of the most important
being the company's own internal research and development department. This thesis examines
the transfer of technology developed in an internal R&D group into product development groups
across multiple business units of the company.
An analysis of the company's documented development process activities and metrics
will establish the context in which technology is transferred. The company's organizational
structure is a central R&D group that supports two market-focused business units, each with their
own technology development group. A series of five case studies tracking technology that was
developed in the central R&D group and transferred to the business units will illustrate the way
technology development activity occurs in the organization.
The R&D organization is structured to support research, applied research, and
development activities that drive both incremental and radical innovation, and it is managed to
support a balance of short term and long term strategic goals. The case studies highlight the fact
that project definition should include attention to the goal the project is intended to achieve, the
type of innovation used to achieve that goal, recognition of the phase or maturity of technological
research in that area, and how those aspects of the project should shape the development process
and plans for communication and collaboration.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Research and development drives new products, processes, and services by forwarding
the technological capabilities of the company, bridging technical hurdles faced by the company's
product development teams, or by designing specific technical solutions to problems faced by
organizations within the company. R&D is not limited to work on the company's externally
marketed products; good R&D can improve the company's internal processes and capabilities as
well. Research and development is arguably the most important function in a technology driven
company, where sales growth is driven by availability of the best new product with the right
technology at the right time. This is particularly true in industries where complex products face a
rapid rate of continuous innovation.
1.2 Problem Statement
There are no universal rules for how to structure R&D organizations effectively or how to
measure their productivity. It is difficult to find the right balance between autonomy and
accountability, creativity and business focus, and near term and long term objectives in an R&D
organization. As will be shown in later chapters, the most appropriate structure for a firm
depends on the company, its products, and its competitive place in the market.
Productivity of research and development activity is hard to measure, particularly when
R&D activity is not tied to a specific business unit or product. There are a wide variety of ways
to measure R&D productivity and none of them are very precise. The time delay that often
occurs between technology development and adoption for use in a product make it hard to predict
the value of innovation or to measure its impact on revenues and profits. It is hard to isolate the
effect of a single technological innovation in a product that requires complex technical
integration. Successful technological innovation can also be overshadowed by the large number
of failed projects; R&D organizations need to engage in many projects to achieve a small number
of big successes.
This thesis is based on an internship at a large U.S. manufacturing company engaged in
an initiative to improve the productivity of their R&D efforts by re-creating their organizational
structure to focus on the company's strategic goals. The study focused on the actual activities
associated with several development projects in order to assess the impact of the organizational
structure and processes on technology productivity.
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1.3 Approach
Productivity will be evaluated in terms of how well R&D activity translates into actual
product or process improvements by examining the transition of technology from R&D into use
and the factors contributing to transition success. Technology transition will be defined as the set
of activities associated with the transfer of technology from the development phase into the use
phase. Technology transition is not a standalone activity, but an element of the process that takes
a technology from discovery through innovation, development, and application. This element of
the process is difficult to manage because it is not explicitly the responsibility of the R&D
organization that develops the technology or of the organization that adopts the technology into
product or process; it is a shared responsibility that must be managed cooperatively at an
enterprise level.
Transition success can be an indicator of how well research and development activity is
supporting the needs of the organization. If a technology is adopted, it may be the result of good
strategic project selection, development that meets the needs of the organization, and a
cooperative effort among the developers, users, and marketers, while non-adoption of a
technology may indicate that the objectives of the developers and users were not aligned.
However, there are also many more complex reasons that a technology might not be adopted,
including miscommunication of requirements from the users to the development team,
introduction of competing technologies, changes in strategic priorities, or political biases of
individuals within the organization. A great deal of work has been done to study barriers and
enablers of technology transition.
This project will examine the development process in the central research and
development organization at a major U.S. manufacturing company, with particular emphasis on
how the transition step fits into the process. A series of case studies conducted over six and a half
months spent working in the central R&D group will be used to illustrate factors that affect
technology transition success and overall technology productivity. The case studies were used to
observe and record the technology development process as it actually occurs, noting interactions
within and among organizations, adherence to published procedural documents prescribing the
development process, and perceptions of success or failure among those engaged in the
development or transition of the technology.
1.4 Outline of Thesis
This thesis will first seek to define the various aspects of research and development
activity in a manufacturing company. There will be a discussion distinguishing among the types
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of development activity, which range in maturity level, risk profile, and relationship to business
goals. R&D activity will be discussed in the context of how it can be used to support business
strategy and what type of strategic design supports different activities most effectively. The
organizational structure of R&D groups will be discussed, exploring the advantages and
disadvantages of a centralized or decentralized organization and of grouping by project area
versus by scientific area of expertise. To define and discuss the role of R&D, this thesis will
draw extensively from published research on R&D, product development, and technology
transition.
The second section of this thesis will cover the design of the R&D organization,
discussing how R&D strategy is implemented in a variety of industries and some of the
challenges that inhibit successful implementation. The discussion of R&D process
implementation will cover choices made by major manufacturing and product companies and
how they reflect the company's product position and competitive place in the market. The
section will conclude with an in depth analysis of the technology development process at the
company that is the subject of this report.
The third section of the thesis will present a series of case studies in technology
development, based on interviews and data collected from June through December, 2006. The
case studies will provide an illustration of the challenges in implementing an R&D strategy,
highlight some successful methods of making technology transition successful, and demonstrate
the complexity of an iterative research and development process.
11
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2 Literature Search
This section will define and discuss approaches to research and development activity and
the resulting role played by R&D organizations within firms. The discussion will cover the
relationship between a company's business strategy and its R&D activity and how R&D may
affect the success of a firm. Then specific aspects of R&D activity will be classified and
discussed, emphasizing that R&D is not a single activity but several types of activities that are
needed to support a firm's technology needs. This section is intended to convey the role R&D
has within a company, not how R&D is conducted.
2.1 The Role of R&D
This definition of the role of R&D is drawn from "Third Generation R&D: Managing the
Link to Corporate Strategy," written in 1991 by Philip A Roussel, Kamal N. Saad, and Tamara J.
Erickson of Arthur D. Little. Roussel et al describe three levels of sophistication in a firm's
approach to R&D, which they label first, second, and third generation R&D. First generation
R&D companies are the least sophisticated. In first generation companies, R&D is an
independent entity that determines its own path and selects long term technology projects to
pursue. The firm provides inputs such as funding, personnel, and facilities and expects output in
the form of technology. The R&D organization is viewed as an overhead expense without clear
ties to operating strategy. Second generation organizations take a more strategic approach to
R&D, using matrix management of projects and tying each development project to a product
strategy. Projects are judged individually rather than as part of a portfolio, making prioritization
and resource allocation difficult.
In a third generation R&D company, a partnership exists between R&D management and
business management. Project decisions are made based on the expected impact on a holistic
portfolio of R&D projects. The strategic role of R&D is defined by three goals of development
activity:
1. Defend, support and expand existing business through modification of products and
materials, introduction of new products within the same market space, or new
manufacturing processes to compete more effectively.
2. Drive new business using either existing or new technology to create product
opportunities outside the current line of business.
13
3. Broaden and deepen technological capability of the firm. This is supported by
activities that may concern existing or new businesses, depending on the perceived
opportunity and the company's competitive position.
Considering each of Roussel et al's generational models in the context of technology
transition, the first generation model is likely to incur the most challenges with respect to
transition. In the first generation model, collaboration is limited between the development
organization and the customer-focused teams that need to adapt the technology into usable
products. The marketing and product development functions are left to pluck technologies out of
R&D when and if they are useful, and then adapt them to their needs as they become better
defined. In second generation R&D, projects have a strategic focus and a clearer link to market-
driven applications. However, the lack of total portfolio management allows for multiple
competing technologies to be developed for some applications while other strategic needs are left
without development resources; transition will be more difficult for technologies in the more
competitive applications. Third generation R&D should have the most effective transition
because projects are chosen to suit the needs of the organization, and portfolio management
ensures careful weeding out of projects so that the projects funded in each area are those most
likely to succeed. Transition is integral to a third generation R&D process.
Another in-depth analysis of the role of R&D is presented in "Engines of Tomorrow:
How the World's Best Companies are Using Their Research Labs to Win the Future" by Robert
Buderi, published in 2000. Buderi conducted an extensive study of the central research labs of
nine major manufacturing companies, including General Electric, Bell Labs (as part of AT&T),
IBM, Siemens, NEC, Xerox, Hewlett Packard, Intel, and Microsoft. His analysis traces both
historical and contemporary relationships between central labs and the companies that they
support.
He provides a much more nuanced approach to defining the role of corporate R&D.
According to Buderi, the role of corporate R&D is to manage the intersection between science
and technology in order to create useful products and drive change and growth through the
broader organization. In effect, he states that transition activity is the central and critical purpose
of an R&D organization. The reason to have an R&D organization is for selecting the right
technology and adapting it to create products that address the market.
Buderi describes the role of R&D in general terms and Roussel et al provide a more
granular description of an R&D group's role and purpose. Both emphasize that an R&D
organization exists to harness scientific and technological developments to enhance the growth
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and performance of the firm. The specific types of activities that are used to pursue these goals
are discussed in the next section.
2.2 Classifying R&D Activity
A lot of activities get grouped under the heading of research and development, ranging
from laboratory level scientific research to complex product design and testing. Different types
of activities require different types of organizational support, incur different levels of risk, and
have a wide range of impacts on the competitive position of a company. Therefore, it is useful to
define the types of activities that occur and the purposes they serve.
The following definitions are adopted from Roussel, et al. R&D is grouped into three
categories based on the type of technology developed and the impact it is expected to have on the
company's products. The three types are Incremental, Radical, and Fundamental.
" Incremental R&D makes small advances on an established foundation of scientific
and engineering knowledge. Incremental R&D has the highest probability of
technical success and usually can be completed in the shortest timeframe, but often
provides a small competitive advantage that lasts only a short time and can be
imitated by competitors.
* Radical Innovation combines new discovery with a foundation of existing scientific
and engineering knowledge in order to address a useful purpose. Radical innovation
research has a modest probability of success and requires more time to develop. By
Roussel et al's definition, this type of research can take between two and seven years
to be viable, but provides significant competitive advantage that can be defended
through patents and is difficult to imitate.
" Fundamental Research seeks previously undiscovered scientific or technological
knowledge as the basis for potential future technology that will generate competitive
advantage. The most difficult type of project to assess, the probability of success is
completely uncertain and depends on the concept and expertise of the research team,
and the time to complete the research will be on the order of four to ten years.
However, this is the type of research most likely to lead to new markets and sustained
(for a time) competitive advantage.
Roussel et al further separate R&D activity into stages of maturity, providing explicit
definitions for research and development.
15
* Research is the creation of new knowledge that will lay the scientific foundations for
a new technology or for new processes.
* Development is the evolution of product or process concepts to prove, refine, and
ready them for commercial application.
Projects can begin as research and progress through development or can begin at development,
depending on the maturity level of the science and engineering principles underlying the
technology and depending on the company's capabilities in that area. Transition planning can
begin early in the research phase or late in the development phase, and may depend on how well
the target product is defined at each point in time or stage in development. When transition
planning begins early in the research phase, a lot of communication is required to keep the project
on track because customer needs, market drivers, and product definition are likely to shift
significantly over the time the technology is developed, which may be years or even decades.
Buderi differentiates similarly between research and development, stating that "research
is where ideas are investigated, refined, and shaped into the beginnings of a new product, system,
or process." Research makes up a very small percentage of overall R&D activity, but when the
right research projects are selected, they can drive new businesses rather than just product
improvements. Buderi further defines that "development is the stage where ideas or prototypes
are taken and engineered into real-life product, ready to be affordably mass-produced and able to
meet reliability standards and fit into the existing infrastructure." Development work is the
majority of the work performed by an R&D organization, and the level of sophistication in the
development work depends on how clearly an organization defines its needs and the awareness
among the developers and users of those needs.
For this thesis, I will also refer to applied research, an intermediate stage between late
research and early development. The combination of the type of innovation pursued-
Incremental, Radical, or Fundamental-and the stage at which the company becomes involved
that innovation-research, applied research or development-influence the risk profile of the
project, the amount of investment required, and the type of resources needed. Furthermore, the
combination of factors affects whether the project is best suited to take place in a centralized
R&D organization or in dispersed development organizations contained within product-focused
business units.
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2.3 R&D Organizational Structures
There are two important variables in the organization of R&D activity within a firm. The
first is whether R&D is conducted in a separate, centralized organization that supports the entire
company or within multiple decentralized organizations with product focus. The second factor is
whether the research and development personnel are grouped according to the project they are
working on or by their area of technological expertise.
2.3.1 Centralized vs. Decentralized
R&D can be structured as a centralized organization, separated physically and
managerially from the businesses that it supports, or it can be decentralized into smaller business-
focused units that are integrated into the business functions and managed under the same budget
and infrastructure as the management of the products it supports. There are advantages to
grouping research and development scientists together in an environment separate from the
businesses that they support. A separate organization can investigate technology that doesn't
align easily with the needs of a single product line, freeing researchers from the profit-driven
metrics of a product focused business unit and allowing for greater creativity. There are also
disadvantages such as limited customer interaction and difficulty transferring technological
developments into the business units that can make them profitable.
Buderi's analysis of development labs at nine major manufacturing companies provides
insight into the advantages and disadvantages of a centralized lab. He shows that historically,
companies such as GE, AT&T, and IBM built large centralized labs, fed them resources, and
allowed them the freedom to pursue academic study in the sciences practically without boundary.
These labs were able to achieve tremendous advancements in science and technology in areas
both within the scope of the companies' markets and outside of them. Eventually, these
organizations grew so independent and autonomous that they provided very little value to the
companies they were supporting. Scientists drove towards new discoveries without much regard
to the means for commercializing them. If the role of an R&D organization is to select and
develop science and technology in a way that promotes the company's objectives, these
companies veered dangerously away from achieving that goal.
In the mid-90s, these companies-- and many others-- reined in their research groups
through massive budget cuts and refocused them on activities that were more closely tied to the
companies' products and markets. This brought R&D to a much tighter focus, with a greater
share of resources committed to short term projects along narrow, well-established business lines.
This focus is likely to have promoted better technology transition because of the emphasis on
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engaging only in projects that were certain to promote business goals. The narrow focus on
specific business goals favored transition success, but did not support the type of creative
research that drives new businesses.
According to Buderi, R&D among major U.S. firms has already begun to swing back in
the other direction, gaining a better balance between market-focused and product-focused
development while reenergizing attention to basic science when it supports strategic market
goals. Buderi cautions against sweeping generalizations of what an R&D organization should
look like, emphasizing that the balance among centralized and decentralized activities in each
company should be shaped by that company's strategy and market position. He points to the role
R&D can play in different industries, from the chemical industry where discovery of a single
compound such as nylon can drive an entire business to the telecommunications equipment
industry where continuous interaction of innovation and scientific discovery combine to propel
the industry forward. In the chemical industry, the ability of basic research to drive profitability
makes a central research group important. In the telecommunications industry, input from the
customer-facing business units is more important in driving the selection of innovations that
interact to create new technological advances.
A 2004 study by Argyres and Silverman investigated the influence of centralized and
decentralized R&D organizational structure on the type of innovation produced by the
organization. They hypothesized that centralized R&D units would produce research with greater
technological impact because of the advantages of economies of scale and scope and the freedom
to pursue non-specific research that may drive new businesses. On the other hand, they expected
that decentralized R&D organizations would produce more capability-deepening developments
that are closely tied to the company's current business interests.
They studied R&D organization and patented innovation in 71 large, mostly diversified
corporations in the mid-1990s, and were able to show that centralized R&D tends to generate
innovations that have a larger impact on future technological developments within and outside the
firm. The impact of a given technology was measured by the number of times that technology's
patent was cited by subsequent patents. They were unable to say whether a hybrid structure-
decentralized development units in addition to a central lab-was better or worse than a
centralized or decentralized organization. However, they did conclude that hybrid organizations
do not necessarily generate innovation that is consistently 'intermediate' between that of
centralized and decentralized firms.
In summary, centralized organizations are best suited for the development of basic
science, radical developments, and technology that may benefit the whole firm or no single
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business line in particular. Decentralized organizations are more effective for focused
development projects that deepen a firm's capability in meeting specific market needs.
2.3.2 Organization by Project Team vs. by Technical Function
"Managing the Flow of Technology: Technology Transfer and the Dissemination of
Technological Information within the R&D Organization" by Tom Allen provides a discussion of
the advantages of managing by project team or by technical function. According to Allen's
analysis, the appropriate model depends on whether the company chooses to focus more on input
or output. Managing by project team is effective for managing output, which means focusing on
the end user and producing the right product for the market. However, it can cut
engineers/scientists off from collaborating with colleagues in their field, so the input or the
expertise of the scientist is not optimal.
On the other hand, if an R&D organization is structured around scientific function, the
scientists can share and collaborate and stay in touch with the cutting edge research in their
function but will be more detached from the project itself and the needs of the customer. Allen
argues that the decision for whether to be project based or function based should be informed by
the length of the project and the rate at which the technology is advancing. Quickly advancing
technologies require greater collaboration within a function to keep the engineers on top of
developments, and long projects can also separate scientists from their field for an extended
period, so in these two cases it is important to organize by function.
2.4 Summary
The two major structural variables in R&D organization are the level of centralization or
decentralization of the R&D activities and the affiliation among project teams and area experts.
The advantages and disadvantages of each factor depend on whether the company will benefit
most from an emphasis on the value of innovation or emphasis on smooth transition and support
of market goals. No firm can rely entirely on one or the other, so a dynamic balance should be
sought.
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3 Development Process Management
This section will discuss some of the management techniques used in coordinating
research and development efforts within a firm, including portfolio management and selection of
projects, metrics for evaluating projects, and monitoring and measurement techniques used to
track the progress of projects.
3.1 Portfolio Management
Portfolio management is the mechanism by which R&D managers try to balance among
long term and short term technology needs of a company, fund both high risk and low risk
projects, and create a space for development of disruptive technologies to drive future business
lines. Portfolio management decisions are ideally made based on the short term technology
challenges and long term technology goals of the company, but can be influenced by a number of
other factors. The available expertise among the R&D staff, short term product development
issues, influential customers, and managers' personal interests and biases can all influence the
selection of projects selected for study.
A study of portfolio management in R&D and product development by Cooper, Edgett,
and Kleinschmidt (1999) investigated the practices of 205 U.S. companies to evaluate their
portfolio management processes and results. The study showed that portfolio management
processes based on strategic goals and consistent with the management style of the firm produced
the most successful results.
Cooper et al identified six important goals of a portfolio management process: (1)
balancing the number of projects with the resources available; (2) maintaining the pace of
development by undertaking projects in a timely manner; (3) maximizing the commercial value
of the portfolio; (4) balancing long term vs. short term, high risk vs. low risk, and across markets
and technologies; (5) aligning projects with business strategy; and (6) mirroring strategic
priorities with funding allocations. Their study found that companies with the best performance
toward these goals had a formal approach to portfolio management and applied explicit processes
consistently across projects. Poor performers had little planning and ad hoc decision making
processes.
Portfolio management techniques in the firms under study included financial models,
strategic decision making, bubble diagrams, scoring models, and checklists. Financial
approaches were the most popular method, but produced the worst results because they usually
did not account properly for risk levels and uncertainty. Scoring models and strategic approaches
performed much better, according to Cooper et al. Use of a process that was consistent with the
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management team's style also produced better results, but this was not as important a factor as the
technique used.
Overall, the management teams interviewed as part of the Cooper et al study were largely
unsatisfied with the results of their portfolio management processes. Cooper et al point out that
while a wealth of literature has developed on the subject since the 1960s, project selection and
project prioritization are consistently weak areas for companies, resulting in competition for
resources and limitations on project success.
3.2 Metrics & Monitoring Techniques
Metrics are necessary to identify and support projects with high potential value or to
recognize and eliminate futile projects. However, metrics are difficult to assign to projects with
highly uncertain outcomes that may take years, or even decades, to produce measurable value.
Traditional financial metrics such as ROI or NPV for a project are extremely prohibitive in the
R&D space. Many R&D projects are destined to fail, and NPV or ROI metrics would be
speculative at best. Furthermore, the drive to produce results with measurable ROI would favor
low-risk, short term projects that are unlikely to drive future business. Program management
metrics such as project milestones and checkpoints tend to be much more successful.
Several types of process metrics and progress monitoring systems have been tried in
R&D organizations, including application of NASA's Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) and
subsequent Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs), and management by the Stage-GateTM
process for product development.
NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense have taken a very methodical approach to
monitoring the progress of technological development that has achieved widespread use. NASA
designed a system to assess the maturity of technology development projects according to a
specified scale, known as Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). To qualify for each level of
technology readiness, certain criteria have to be met. TRLs are both a measurement tool,
allowing program managers to track progress within the development of a technology, and a
communication tool, enabling comparison across multiple technologies. With the information
provided by TRLs, technology development professionals know whether new innovations are
ready for incorporation into their design. More importantly, they know when an innovation has
not reached a level of maturity sufficient for use and can avoid designs that rely on technology
that is not sufficiently developed.
NASA's TRLs are described in the following table:
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Level Description/Criteria
TRL 1 Basic principles observed and reported
TRL 2 Technology concept and/or application formulated
TRL 3 Analytical and experimental critical function and/or characteristic proof-of-
concept
TRL 4 Component and/or breadboard validation in laboratory environment
TRL 5 Component and/or breadboard validation in relevant environment
TRL 6 System/subsystem model or prototype demonstration in a relevant
environment
TRL 7 System prototype demonstration in a space environment
TRL 8 Actual system completed and "flight qualified" through test and
demonstration
TRL 9 Actual system "flight proven" through successful mission operations
Figure 1: NASA Technology Readiness Levels'
The TRLs were designed for space applications, but have proven to be exceptionally useful and
have been widely adopted throughout the defense contracting industry to communicate with
various Department of Defense organizations.
TRLs are limited to technological maturity. This makes them useful for assessment of
the progress of technology development, but does not provide any information as to whether or
when the technology will be ready for hand-off to production. This is not surprising, given that
space technology is not typically transitioned into high-volume production. Many other defense
industry technologies are.
In 2002, the GAO conducted an analysis of several successful and less-than-successful
transitions from technology development into production. The study concluded that a more
systematic approach to technology transition was critical and observations from the study were
used to craft a set of Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) to complement the TRL system
developed by NASA. A Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel (JDMTP)
Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) Working Group was set up to develop the MRL system.
The JDMTP-MRL defines manufacturing readiness as "the ability to harness the manufacturing,
production, quality assurance, and industrial functions to achieve an operational capability that
satisfies mission needs-in the quantity and quality needed by the war-fighter to carry out
assigned missions at the best value as measured by the war-fighter." 2
1 MRL Guide (Draft), Mar. 2007, pp 15-16.
2 MRL Guide (Draft). Mar. 2007, pp 6.
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The goal of the MRL system is to provide program managers with a tool to evaluate
programs and manage the risks associated with the development and adoption of new technology.
More specifically, assigning MRLs requires project managers to identify whether new processes
and tooling will be necessary, address suppliers early, and assess the program continuously to
determine whether objectives are being met. Additionally, MRL assessment offers the
opportunity to influence design where appropriate in order to increase manufacturability of the
technology. Note that while a technology will be allowed to progress to a higher TRL without
meeting MRL requirements, it must, by definition, meet all TRL criteria up to that level in order
to qualify for an MRL.
The following table summarizes the MRLs3:
MRL Meets Criteria Engineering/Design
TRL Changes
1-3 1-3 * Identification of manufacturing concepts or producibility significant
needs
4 4 e System, component, or item validated in laboratory significant
environment;
e Producibility assessments initiated
5 5 * System, component, or item validated in an initial significant
relevant environment;
* Initial producibility assessment completed;
e Manufacturing cost drivers identified;
* Initial Manufacturing Plan developed
6 6 e System, component, or item validated in an initial Significant
relevant environment;
* Materials, machines, and tooling have been
demonstrated in a relevant environment;
* Manufacturing processes still in development;
* Producibility assessment for ongoing improvements
begun
7 7 o System, component, or item in advanced development; Decreasing
o Physical and functional interfaces clearly defined;
o Pilot line manufacturing processes set up and under test;
o Processes and procedures demonstrated in a production
relevant environment;
o Production estimates established
3 MRL Guide (Draft), Mar. 2007, pp 16-19.
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8 8 0 System, component, or item in advanced development and decreasing
ready for low rate production; significantly
* Physical and functional interfaces clearly defined;
0 Manufacturing processes and procedures have been
proven on the pilot line, under control, and ready for low
rate initial production;
e Production estimates meet production goals
9 9 e System, component, or item previously produced or in minimal
production, or in low rate initial production;
* Manufacturing processes established and controlled in
production to three sigma
10 10 0 System, component, or item previously produced or in minimal
production;
* System, component or item meets all engineering,
performance, quality and reliability requirements
Figure 2: Manufacturing Readiness Levels
TRLs have been widely adopted throughout the defense industry, and MRLs are gaining
traction because of the usefulness of a common language in the multi-party development
collaboration characteristic of military contracts.
A common method for managing commercial product development projects is the Stage-
GateTM process 4 , which is designed for product development but can be applicable to technology
development as well. The Stage-GateTM process emphasizes innovation as a process that can be
subject to monitoring, review, and continuous improvement. The process requires breaking the
product development process into incremental steps (Stages) separated by decision points (Gates).
The process is designed to increase the stake in the project as uncertainty is reduced. This is
accomplished by timely evaluation, decision, and bail-out points throughout the development
process.
Each Stage in the process is multidisciplinary and concerns several areas of product
development, not isolated activities. Associated with each Gate is a set of deliverables that must
be accomplished and a set of criteria that must be met. A project cannot progress past a Gate
unless it has met all the requirements of the preceding Stage, making each Gate an opportunity
for a go/kill decision on the project.
4 The Product Development Institute, Inc. www.prod-dev.com
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3.3 Summary
The purpose of metrics and monitoring devices is to provide discipline to the
development process. With consistent measurement techniques, managers can compare and
prioritize projects, using the information to make resource allocation decisions, go/kill decisions,
and share information on development progress with customers and suppliers. Enhanced
communication and awareness of technological progress provides more informed portfolio
management and a more balanced approach to technology. It also provides information on
technology availability to the business units as they build plans to commercialize the technology.
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4 Research and Development in Practice
The role of R&D varies significantly by industry, and is shaped by the type of R&D
activities that drive a company's competitiveness. At one extreme, the focus of R&D effort is
basic scientific discovery. At the other extreme R&D is geared towards complex integration of
traditional and established technology with multiple new scientific and technological
advancements. Most firms lie somewhere in between these extremes, and their balance of
activity is determined by their products and market. The industry under study falls at the
complex end of the scale, but examples from industries more focused on basic research will be
discussed for comparison.
uChemical High Tech
Consumer
Packaged
Scientific Goods o 14
Discovery N
Pharmaceutical Automotive
Aerospace
Figure 3: Estimates of R&D Complexity for Various Industries
4.1 Basic Research Focus: Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries
Chemical and pharmaceutical companies are completely dependent on and driven by
R&D activity.5 The type of R&D that is important is basic research or the search for new
chemical compounds, genes, proteins, etc. In these industries a single scientific discovery can
drive an entire industry. Development activity is less important to companies at this end of the
scale. The process is fairly standardized, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry where
development and transition activity are clearly prescribed by clinical trial procedures as
developed by the FDA. Discovery of a new chemical compound is followed by a series of
clinical trials that first test and optimize for safety, followed by efficacy testing, followed by
dosing experiments. This process supports a gradual transition that explicitly identifies and
5 This section is based on a conversation with Rebecca Henderson, Professor of Management at MIT Sloan
School of Management.
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selects successful technology and provides a clear path to connect the technology to the customer
when appropriate.
4.2 Application Focus: Consumer Products
Consumer products companies exist somewhere in the middle of the scale. The typical
level of complexity is low, but business is driven more by creative transition than new scientific
discovery. Consumer products growth is driven by finding new ways to apply and market
technology that was discovered and developed for other uses or finding cheaper, more efficient
ways to provide common technology. For example, Proctor and Gamble's R&D activity is
focused on taking technological advances and getting them into production as soon and as
profitably as possible, rather than on basic research. The company recently embarked on a new
R&D strategy, called the "Connect and Develop" model which addresses this type of technology
application. Connect and Develop is a system modeled after open-source software development
that takes the burden of basic research off of their R&D group by encouraging them to find new
product ideas anywhere, either within the firm or from labs, smaller companies, or in use by other
industries for entirely different applications. The emphasis is on finding the technology and
translating it immediately into something useful and desirable to the customer. The process
works because there is clear knowledge among members of the R&D organization and external
idea seekers of exactly which kind of ideas fit the P&G model and which don't. Company
executives note a "clear sense of customers' needs" among the development staffP. This is
because the business has clearly articulated top business needs, translated them into science
problems that need solutions called "technology briefs," and put the question to as many people
as possible.
Implementation of the Connect and Develop strategy at P&G has lowered overall R&D
costs while lots of new ideas have flowed in from external sources to fuel the company's growth
in new product areas. In many cases the costs were reduced through engagement in partnerships.
In other cases, suppliers were willing to work with P&G to make adjustments and improvements
to their products in order to grow the market. This works for P&G because the company's
success does not rely on being at the forefront of science, but rather on finding new ways to
address customer's needs with differentiated product.
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6 Huston, pp. 61.
4.3 Integrative Development: High Tech, Industrial Products
High tech and industrial manufacturing companies fall at the complex end of the scale. A
single scientific discovery or technological improvement is unlikely to be a major driver of the
industry. Instead, new products are the result of complex integration of new and old technology
in novel ways. If the research and development activity is structured well, transition will happen
naturally but the high complexity of development activity requires tremendous attention to the
technical aspects, so less attention may be reserved for transition and implementation. The
company studied for this project falls into this category; further analysis of the organizational
structure follows.
4.4 R&D at a Large U.S. Industrial Equipment Manufacturer
The company studied for this thesis is a major U.S. industrial equipment manufacturer.
This section will provide a detailed description of the company's strategy, organizational
structure, processes, and approach to development to illustrate how they operate in the context of
their industry and product strategy.
4.4.1 Strategy
The company's R&D strategy is to support the growth of the business by developing
competitive advantage through technological advancement. The company markets products that
are technologically complex and are driven by the integration of multiple technological
developments. A single technological discovery rarely drives a new product on its own;
technological developments are used to improve product performance, drive down costs of
materials or production, or improve processes throughout the firm. The R&D organization
engages in long term research projects to drive future business growth while providing
technological advancements through new products, product improvements, and advanced
manufacturing processes.
4.4.2 Structure
A central R&D group supports the company's two major business units, each of which is
focused on a different end market. Each business unit also has its own internal technology
development organization, managed entirely within the business unit. The hybrid R&D structure
was built through extensive merger and acquisition activity over the past two decades as the
company acquired multiple other companies, each with its own R&D organization that was
maintained in the merger. As the conglomeration of R&D organizations evolved, each R&D
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group preserved its own history, biases, project management practices, capabilities, and
relationships with the rest of the company. This thesis is based on an internship that took place in
the central R&D group.
A simplified outline of the structure is shown below. Dark boxes represent technology
development organizations and light boxes represent corporate business units. Dark arrows
indicate the direction of support provided while light arrows represent the direction of authority.
Central R&D supports both business units directly and through their technology groups, but
reports only to corporate. Each business unit relies on its own internal group and the central
R&D, but only has direct authority over its internal group The effect is that the business units can
use their internal groups to get things done without having to find ways to influence or
manipulate the central R&D group.
Corporate Headquarters
Commercial Products Government Products
Business Unit Business Unit
Figure 4: Simplified Organizational Structure
Geographical dispersion adds a layer of complexity to the organizational structure. The
central R&D group is divided among three major sites and several smaller satellite locations, all
of which are collocated with manufacturing operations. The R&D organizations are most
responsive to the business units whose manufacturing operations share their site. The site-level
cooperation seems to be a result of shared history and experience rather than just the effect of
proximity. Central R&D evolved out of an acquisition and is still headquartered at that acquired
company's former headquarters. There are close ties among employees who were once a part of
the acquired company, whether they are in R&D, product development, production, or other
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functions. The same happens at other sites. Although the R&D groups at the other site locations
are officially part of central R&D and are expected to share resources and responsibilities, they
originated as part of the business units that share their sites and are much more responsive to
those businesses' needs, even if it sometimes requires engaging in redundant activities or projects
that could be better addressed at another site.
The central R&D group is the major focus of this study. Within the central R&D, the
organization is a matrix structure across three dimensions: project focus, project maturity, and
geography. Individual research professionals are grouped by areas of focus defined by the market
needs or problem areas they are trying to address. Each area of focus is comprised of people
representing a mix of disciplines, although the selection of disciplines represented is biased by the
type of problem the group is engaged in solving. Materials scientists, chemists, and associated
disciplines tend to work on similar problems and consequently are often grouped together, while
mechanical engineers, structural designers, and industrial engineers tend to be assigned to similar
projects and work together. Managers typically manage activities within a focus area and across
multiple maturity levels and geographic locations.
Projects are grouped by maturity level. Basic research and non-specific early stage
development activity are grouped together, while advanced applied research and later stage
product-focused development activities form another group. Projects that don't fall under either
umbrella are generally conducted under contract for another organization or in response to
specific technical requests from the business units. There are projects from almost every focus
area at each maturity level, and each maturity level has a manager to coordinate activities,
resources, and personnel, typically someone who also has focus area responsibility.
Historically, many projects were managed within a site. Separate budgets for each site
and close proximity to and relationships with different business units promoted division of
activity. This created some barriers to sharing expertise across sites and limited flexibility to
respond to variability in project needs. Recent efforts have been made to increase cooperation
across sites, including virtual teams that meet through WebEx conference calls and new
accounting rules that allow for collaboration across sites without explicit contracting for transfer
pricing.
4.4.3 Management
The central R&D organization is governed at a corporate level, reporting directly to the
Chief Technology Officer of the company. The organization does not report directly to the
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business units, but the business units can influence the R&D organization through cooperation,
collaboration, or lobbying to the executive level management.
4.4.4 Customers
Central R&D serves both internal and external customers. The internal customers are
primarily the two largest business units of the organization, the commercial products division and
the government products division. Central R&D provides work to these customers under two
scenarios: (1) in response to requests for technical assistance; or (2) when an internally funded
project reaches maturity and is ready to transition to a program for application. In the first type of
scenario, the business unit is pulling technology from central R&D, often to consult on a problem
that the business unit has attempted unsuccessfully to solve on its own or lacks the resources to
solve. The second type of scenario is usually targeted at a business unit or at a specific product,
and may or may not have been requested or recognized by the business unit. Both scenarios
require marketing and communication to match the technology with the customer's needs.
External customers are usually related in some way to the U.S. government, particularly
the Department of Defense. Central R&D provides contract work for national labs, NASA,
several branches of the military, and other government agencies as well as collaborating with
those organizations on development projects. In some cases, central R&D will act as a
subcontractor on major programs funded by these organizations through other companies.
4.4.5 Funding
Historically, the central R&D group's operating activities were considered an overhead
expense, supported by a "tax" paid by the business units. The central R&D has recently
transitioned to a standalone business model, in which it must justify and support its own cost
structure. As a standalone unit, the group will be expected to cover expenses by generating
revenues through external work and through charging market rates to the business units for work
completed within the division. The change to standalone unit occurred after the period of study;
during that time the organization was preparing for the shift.
4.4.6 Metrics
Qualitative and quantitative metrics are used to evaluate R&D activity. Qualitative
metrics focus on project goals and milestones, tracking whether those milestones have been met
within the targeted timeframe at the targeted cost (or number of engineering hours). Central
R&D does not use an explicit StageGate TM process, but the use of milestones and decision points
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is similar. Quantitative metrics assess the number of technology transfer events and their
financial impact on the company. Financial impact is determined by estimating the revenues
generated or costs avoided as a result of a technology's application. Estimates are made by the
development team and the product team that implemented the technology. Often, financial
impact is extremely hard to measure because new sales may not be traceable to one particular
technological development, especially when the technology is integral to a complex design.
There is some concern that the quantitative (and to some extent the qualitative) metrics
drive behavior that will produce lots of low-risk projects with easily measured financial impact,
while longer term high-risk/high-reward projects will be neglected. This potential misalignment
of incentives seems to be partly mitigated by the general attitude of the research staff. For the
most part, those engaged in technological research at the central R&D organization are highly
involved in technology and motivated by the satisfaction of participation in high impact,
meaningful research, which includes long term projects. The incentive problem is further
mitigated by active portfolio management by the CTO and R&D organization leadership.
4.4.7 Process
Central R&D's technology development process follows a methodology to take
technology from basic research through applied research, development, and deployment. The
process is directed by two internally published procedural documents. One is a high level outline
of the general activities that are intended to take place in the central R&D group. Activities are
grouped into four stages of development that are integrative and iterative; none stands on its own,
so the emphasis is on a holistic approach to the development process. Areas of technology
expertise are defined and grouped by strategic capability needs, or technology areas designated as
strategically important to the growth of the company. Strategic capability needs are tied to
business unit needs and overall market strategy. Determined by the Chief Technology Officer
cooperatively with the business units, those needs form the basis for portfolio management
decisions, create affiliations among researchers with complementary expertise, and call out the
strategic technology objectives so that they are recognizable throughout the organization.
The second document is a more detailed methodology for implementation of the process,
and assigns responsibility for various elements of the development process. It outlines
technology transition planning that provides an explicit hand-off of technology from one group to
another, typically with the expectation of further development required for local application. The
transition planning process also requires an estimation of the projected future value of the
technology at the time of transition in order to measure productivity. A process council is
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designated to facilitate transitions when enterprise level cooperation is needed to ensure
successful transfer of technology.
The documents were generated as a result of a two year process-development initiative in
which all management and leadership within the R&D group at the time was involved. The
documents were released and the new process initiated in November, 2005. Unfortunately, two
months later, and before the process could be fully adopted and implemented, an external audit of
the R&D group found that the organization was not following their documented process and
recommended creation of a new process. The audit apparently failed to recognize that a major
reason that the process was not followed was the fact that it was newly established and had not
been fully socialized. Thus the process has still not been fully implemented across the
organization.
4.4.8 Business Unit R&D
Both the commercial and the government unit have their own internal R&D
organizations, which are funded entirely of their own P&L and are much more product focused
than the central R&D organization. Both business unit technology groups cooperate with and
rely heavily on the central R&D group, but inevitably compete with the internal group for funding
and for dominance in high profile technology areas.
The technology development organization within the commercial division is driven by
attention to near term and long term market needs. Activities are grouped according to themes,
and each theme addresses a particular market need that the business unit has to meet in order to
be competitive. The group seeks to integrate technology development from Central R&D and
external sources, selecting and funding the best potential solutions to address the themes. The
government business unit's technology organization has a product-oriented structure. Working
groups are organized around product programs and development teams are focused on acquiring,
synthesizing, and providing technology that supports those product programs. Transition activity
should be a major focus of both of these organizations, because their purpose is selection,
development, and application of technology appropriate for the business unit's products.
However, communication with central R&D about market needs and technology availability is
inconsistent.
Like the central R&D organization, the commercial and government business units have
several internally published procedural documents outlining the process for development
activities. The commercial unit's process is more focused on methodology and process steps for
development than on the deliverables that result from the process. In contrast, the government
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group's internally published process documents are very focused on timing and hand off of
deliverables than on development methodology. The difference in emphasis reflects slightly
different product strategies between the two business units.
An initiative is currently underway to outline an enterprise-wide development process.
The process will preserve each business units' alignment with their product strategy but will
provide clearer links between the central R&D group and the business unit technology groups,
defining which activities fall under the responsibilities of which group and specifying a means for
coordination and handoff of technologies ready for transition.
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5 Case Studies: Selection and Description
This section will describe and analyze five case studies based on projects studied over a
six month period from June through December, 2006, while employed as an intern in the central
R&D group. First, the methodology for selection, data collection, and analysis of the case studies
will be described. Then each case will be described in detail and discussed in the context of
transition success.
5.1 Selection
The projects were selected to represent multiple technology areas, including two new
materials development projects, two advanced structural design projects, and one software tool
developed for internal use. The projects chosen faced multiple transition opportunities, some of
which met with success and others that failed to transition to products. The selection was limited
to projects which had a widely known or well-recorded history over the life of the project in order
to ensure that sufficient information would be available to gain a full understanding of the issues
involved. All projects studied originated in the central R&D group with the goal of transitioning
the technology to the business units.
The initial proposal was to choose pairs of successes and failures in similar technology
areas in order to compare and identify barriers to transition. However, it was nearly impossible to
find projects that were universally accepted as either a clear success or a clear failure. Most
projects were viewed as both, and the assessment was based more on who was asked and how
they perceived the project from their role or position rather than based on any objective criteria
for success.
5.2 Data Collection
Data was collected through interviews, documentation, and observation of the development
teams involved in the selected case studies.
5.2.1 Interviews
The interviews targeted both the development team for a project as well as the product
team that adopted the new technology and implemented it into their product or process. A typical
interview lasted between thirty minutes and one hour. Interviews were open-ended and largely
unstructured in order to gather as much insight and information as possible without influencing
the interviewees' answers, but followed a general outline in order to maintain some structure and
consistency across projects.
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Development Team
Each interviewee on a development team was asked to describe the origin of the
development project to the best of their knowledge, identify their role in the process, outline the
development process, and comment on factors that enabled or inhibited their ability to contribute
to the project's success. Interviewees were asked to speculate on why they believed the
technology was adopted (or not adopted), or to recall when they first heard about the problem that
the technology was designed to address.
The following is an outline of a typical interview conducted with someone involved in a
development team:
o Idea Generation: What was the basis for the project? Whose idea was it? Why
was it pursued?
o Initial Funding: Where did initial funding come from, and how did this affect
development agenda?
o Initial Target Programs: Was there a clear target product for the technology, or
was it aimed at solving a particular problem?
o Marketing to Programs: How were programs made aware of the technology's
development? How were programs' needs incorporated? Who made contact
with programs?
o Adoption: Discuss the decision to transition the technology to the program.
Whose decision? What initiated it? Why did (or didn't) the program adopt the
technology?
o Integration of Suppliers: Were vendors/suppliers necessary? Whose job was it
to work with them? Were they involved in the development or was the
technology shared with them after the decision was made to implement?
o Communication with Customer (see also: Marketing to Programs): How
frequently did development team communicate with the customer (adopting
program)? Who on the team was engaged in this communication?
o Continued Support: What level of support was planned for post-transition
activity?
o Development Team Makeup: # of Members, Backgrounds, Disciplines
Represented, External Participants (including customers, vendors)
o Products Adopting Technology (and list of contacts)
38
o Documents
o Other
Adoption Team
The interviews for the adopting teams were more focused on awareness of the technology
and accommodations made by the product team in order to adopt the technology. Interviewees
were asked to recall how and why the technology was adopted, relating the context in which
alternative options were considered, decisions were made, and adoption was supported. The
following is an outline of those interviews:
o Reason for Adoption: What need did this technology address for the program?
Why was this technology the right choice?
o Awareness of Technology: How did members of the program/product
development team know that this technology was available and had potential to
meet the program's needs?
o Decision to Adopt: Who made the decision to adopt (or not adopt) the
technology? Based on what criteria?
o Alternative Solutions Considered: Were there alternatives to adopting
technology? What were they and why weren't they chosen? How do they
compare on a technical basis?
o Accommodations to Adopt/Adoption Process: Was the technology ready to go
or were process accommodations needed to incorporate it's use? i.e. new
production process, new specifications, qualification, etc.
o Selection/integration of Supplier: Were suppliers needed to provide elements
of the technological solution? Whose responsibility was it to integrate them?
Was the technology licensed or shared?
o Adoption Beyond Initial Need: Did the program adopt the technology for
multiple uses beyond the initial targeted use? How were these decisions made?
Did they require technical changes to the technology?
o Continued Tech Support: Did the development team provide support once the
technology was adopted? How was this structured? How frequently was it used?
o Other Comments
39
5.2.2 Documents
The quality and availability of documentation of the projects was highly variable. It
ranged from detailed recording of correspondence among team members, minutes of team
meetings, documentation of funding decisions, and recorded design iterations to an ad hoc
collection of PowerPoint presentations that had been used for progress reports to management. In
some cases the documents were catalogued and stored on a central network drive, while in other
cases the best or only available information was stored in hard copies with hand-written
annotation in a team members' desk. For several of the cases I was able to find public documents
including patents, journal publications, and conference abstracts. In the worst case,
documentation was not available (or not made available to me).
5.2.3 Observation
Observation of the actual development activity was not feasible in most of these cases for
several reasons. Many of the projects had been in development for over fifteen years and the
amount of active work (other than ad hoc support work) going on was very limited. In other
cases, work was happening on an ongoing basis but development work was slow and hard to
observe. I did not observe meetings among team members, but I was occasionally able to read
the summaries of team meetings and speak with those involved after the meetings had occurred. I
was also able to examine test materials, view videos of lab testing of components and systems,
and inspect prototypes.
5.2.4 Evaluation
Projects were not labeled successes or failures for the purposes of this project. All
projects selected had elements of success, such as adoption onto products, cost savings, and
collaboration among divisions, and elements of failure, such as schedule slips, funding cuts, cost
increases, and rejection by product groups. Generalizing the projects as successful or not would
limit the analysis.
5.3 Descriptions of Individual Case Studies
For each case study, a description of the technology will include a discussion of the
development process, from origination of the project through development and transition of the
technology and activities that followed up the technology transition, such as support work and
additional transitions. For each case described, an illustration of the development process will be
provided.
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Some definition of terms used in the case discussions will be useful. For this study,
origination of the technology project refers to the point at which the company became involved in
the technology and made the decision to pursue its development by allocating resources. Several
of these technologies have a history of development by industry or academia before their
selection as a development project for the company, but that will not be covered here except to be
mentioned in general terms. The names and certain technical details of the technology projects as
well as the adopting products have been changed; materials projects will be designated M- 1 and
M-2, structural design projects designated S-1 and S-2, and the tool project T-1. Programs
referred to in the discussion are organizations responsible for groups of products. The programs
that have adopted (or attempted to adopt) the technology into one or more of their products will
be designated with a G (G- 1, G-2, etc.) if they were part of the government products business unit
or a C (C-1, C-2, etc.) if they were part of the commercial products business unit.
5.3.1 Materials Project 1 (M-1): Chemical Treatment Process
M- 1 is a novel process for the application of chemicals to metal alloys to promote
bonding of metal to coatings, metal to metal, or metal to other structural materials. It has the
benefit of reduced environmental hazard and superior technical performance relative to the
process it is designed to replace. It is an example of a project that began as research towards a
strategic organizational goal, progressed somewhat steadily through applied research to
development targeted at specific applications, and eventually to deployment and replication
across many products. The project was funded both internally and externally, and adoptions of
the technology occurred as the result of both pull from the product groups and push from the
development team.
Origination
The M-I development project began as a basic research program in an early experimental
phase. The project originated because an individual with extensive academic research
background in this area and an interest in pursuing the technology was hired into the R&D group.
The early stages of the project were exploratory in nature, designed to investigate the properties
and potential applications for M-1 technology. Effort was directed toward a goal of using the
technology to replace hazardous chemical processes with more benign alternatives, a common
goal across the organization. Several potential applications were considered in the early stages,
but there were no particular target programs in mind during the early investigation phase.
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Development Process
Once the chemistry was proven in the lab, the project moved further into the applied
research space with funding from both internal and external programs. In 1993, the Air Force
Research Lab (AFRL) released a request for proposals to reduce hazardous chemical use in a
variety of applications. The company was well positioned to compete for this contract because of
the extensive research that had already taken place. AFRL funded the project and continued to
fund it based on success with the technology through 1997, eventually requesting that the
technology be optimized for use in specific bonding applications.
Concurrent with the AFRL contract, internal funding was used to support further
exploration of the technology as an environmentally friendly alternative to hazardous processes
for treatment of metal alloys. The internally funded work pursued applications not addressed in
the AFRL study, particularly in areas that had potential value to the commercial business unit.
Both internally and externally funded work continued for several years, achieving a standard
formulation for the chemistry and engaging multiple external organizations in cooperative
research and testing. The external organizations included various branches of the military,
national labs, and government departments; all were potential future customers for products
incorporating the technology.
Transition from development to application was also planned for multiple uses. As
development progressed, the project shifted focus to process specifications, feasibility data, and
testing that would support planned transitions.
Initial Technology Transition
The technology was still moving from the applied research phase into the development
phase when a significant and unexpected pull from the G-I product group (also called the G-1
program) triggered an acceleration of the development process. G-1 faced a situation in which
they had no technical solution to a problem that could be a major barrier to the manufacture and
assembly of their product. Although M- 1 was designed as a benign alternative to chemical
processes, the M-I process had other technical features that were advantageous; one feature
offered a way to address the G-I team's problem.
G- 1 was responsible for assembly of a number of metal parts that were treated with a
chemical process prior to assembly. The program faced a problem when certain features of one
of the parts prevented use of the chemical treatment process. The program attempted to use the
parts untreated, but the parts failed to perform successfully so alternative solutions for chemical
treatment of the part were sought. The program was under considerable time pressure and cost
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limitations and unaware of any obvious workarounds besides building an additional production
line dedicated to that part, which could cost as much as $20 million.
There was no formal communication channel to inform the M- 1 team of the G- 1
program's need, or to make the the G-1 team aware that the M-1 process had potential to address
the chemical treatment problem. There is some disagreement as to how the matching occurred.
Members of the M-1 development team recalled being contacted by the G- 1 team asking for help.
Members of the G- 1 team had difficultly remembering when or how they became aware of the
existence of the M-1 process treatment and why it was investigated as a solution. One member of
the team claimed "osmosis," while another stated, "I don't know, but I'm sure I didn't read about
it and I didn't hear about it at a conference."
Further investigation of the "osmosis" phenomenon revealed that the M- 1 development
team and the G- 1 program team were collocated at the time, and that one member of the G- 1
materials team had previously worked on the M- 1 development team during the early stages of
the technology's development. That individual recalled that she was aware of some of the
technology's capabilities and had some idea that it could work in this context even though it was
outside the design space targeted by the technology development. Other members of the team
recalled earlier contact from members of the development team who were seeking to target G- 1
with the M- 1 technology for a different application.
The decision to adopt the M-1 process was based on trade studies conducted by the G-1
team in cooperation with the M- 1 development team. According to the G- 1 team, the M- 1
process easily passed the required tests, which were relatively straightforward. If the chemical
process had not been sufficiently developed to be used "as is," the G-1 program might have
continued to look for another solution. However, the development work on M- 1 was sufficiently
advanced, and the technical requirements for this particular use were low, so the tests were
conducted and the technology was adopted once it had passed.
Despite G- I's requirement that the technology be ready to use immediately, some
cooperative development was still needed to make the M- 1 process production-ready. The
development team was not anticipating an immediate transition before the request by G-1, and
had not yet defined the production process or identified a supplier to apply the process to prepare
the part for assembly. Therefore, the decision to adopt the M- 1 treatment process required rapid
development of a production process for the technology which had only been used in the lab.
Initially the development team trained an internal group to prepare the chemistry and apply the
process. Eventually the process was transitioned to a vendor to prepare the parts for assembly.
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Subsequent Transition Events: SW Site
After the initial transition to the G-l program, the project resumed more or less its
planned development path (with some additional disruptions that won't be covered here). There
were several successive adoptions of the M-1 process for various uses; manufacturing operations
at the Southwest (SW) and Northeast (NE) sites both adopted the technology in response to a
planned transition and marketing push from central R&D. They both followed a pattern of
adoption in which the development team marketed the technology to the programs, the programs
tested and accepted the technology, but did not use it in products immediately. Then a need or
opportunity arose and the program pulled the technology onto products.
The SW site became aware of M-I through intensive marketing by the development
team. Representatives of the materials group at the SW site recall that information on M- 1
technology came to the site from several sources, including company meetings, papers and
presentations. Through these formal channels, the materials team at the SW site became aware of
the technology's existence, but not of specific capabilities or applications. They learned of the
technology's capabilities when the development team from central R&D contacted them to
provide demonstrations of the technology and initiate testing in an application where the program
faced a perennial problem with no satisfactory solution.
The decision to adopt M- 1 technology at the SW site was made because of technical
superiority, lower costs, cooperative development opportunity, and good timing. The
development team demonstrated that M-I was technically superior to alternative chemical
treatment processes and the application process was more flexible and required lower capital
investment than other options. The development team's willingness to share the technology and
engage the SW site product teams in developing their own test methodology helped the product
teams to understand the technology, adapt it to their needs, and feel ownership. The SW site had
a lot of processes that the development team did not know or understand, so they made their
requirements very clear (after the initial demonstrations of the technology), then the development
team and the SW site product team spent 1000-1500 hours (SW's estimate) "devoted to
incorporation, revising drawings and specs." Timing was a significant factor; a program at the
site was already qualifying a new bond primer and could include M- 1 in the testing and
qualification process that was underway.
The M-I technology was qualified for use, but failed to be adopted by the program
immediately. The program had already contracted chemical treatments to a supplier with strong
ties to the customer and a 3 to 4 year investment in development of their own process tailored
specifically to the program. Neither the supplier nor the customer saw a clear advantage to the
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M- 1 technology over their own process. However, when the program later encountered
significant manufacturing problems with the supplier's system, they were able to immediately
implement the M- 1 process based on their earlier qualification work.
The supplier was still resistant to adopt M- 1 because they did not consider it a
production-friendly process. The supplier also refused to lower their price even though M-1
process could be applied at much lower cost, because they had already invested in capacity and
equipment for the more expensive chemical process and wanted a return on their investment.
However, consistent technological support from the development team helped overcome these
barriers to implementation. Post-implementation the program team was able to contact the
development team with questions and concerns, consistently getting responses within a few
hours.
Subsequent Transition Events: NE Site
The adoption of M- 1 at the NE site followed a similar pattern to the adoption at the SW
site. Awareness of the technology built up through formal and informal communication channels.
A materials and process engineer handling most of the bonding issues for the site could not recall
precisely when he first learned of the technology, but indicated that it was either when he was
contacted by the development team asking about needs and offering demonstrations, or through a
natural working group7. They were also aware of the technology through contact with programs
at other sites, including the SW site.
According to people at the NE site, the decision to adopt the M-1 process was easy. The
technology was superior, the costs were low especially when evaluated over the life of a product,
the development team was responsive to the needs of their programs, and the timing was good.
The NE site was starting on a new product program. "Engineers had struggled with the old
process on other programs for 20 years and couldn't always pass process control coupons, so
there was a need for something better than the standard." The development team was able to
demonstrate that M- l's performance was more consistent at lower cost. A cost study showed that
the M-1 process would save approximately $1OM over the life of the product.
The NE site materials team pointed out that the M- 1 process could be incorporated into
product design when drawings were completed because the program was right at the beginning of
a new product. This was far simpler than making changes to an established product to
incorporate the technology. Furthermore, the technology was almost ready to use by the time the
7 Natural working groups have a history of about ten years, and are loose affiliations of people working in
similar technological areas in various programs across the company.
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NE site looked at it. There was a preliminary specification, the technology was fairly well proven
in the lab, and it was thoroughly tested. Scaling up was the only challenge, but the development
team provided support and funding to meet this challenge.
In this case, the M- 1 process failed to be adopted immediately, because the new program
was cancelled. The technology didn't sit on the shelf for long, because the materials and process
group was comfortable with the technology and eager for a substitute for their old process as
other products went through design changes. Multiple applications were delayed by the need to
justify changing engineering drawings, but when drawings needed to be changed for another
reason, the new technology could be incorporated into the changes. The NE site uses the
technology widely now, and indicated that it would be used on any program in multiple
applications.
The NE site has also relied on the development team for continued technical support. A
recent production problem highlighted the importance of the development team's support; the
development team sent a representative to the site to help address the problem immediately and
funded the visit.
Subsequent Transition Events: Late Transition
By 2001, the M-I technology had been in development for almost ten years, a corporate
specification had been defined for the process, and the technology was widely used both
internally and externally by licensed vendors. Yet when the C-3 program, a major product group
in the commercial business unit, tried to adopt the technology to address an issue with the
chemical treatment process for fasteners, the adoption process took over two years. This adoption
highlights the fact that technology transition always requires cooperative development work, even
on a relatively mature technology.
When the C-3 program encountered their problem, M- 1 was a widely known technology
and had been used throughout the company in dozens of applications on programs in both the
commercial and government business units. A representative of the C-3 program indicated that
he had heard about M-I for seven or eight years before looking at the technology for this
application. The M-1 technology was pursued as a potential solution to the problem because a
general brainstorming session throughout the commercial division had suggested that it might
work.
The problem arose because of a change in environmental regulations that restricted the
use of several chemical treatment processes used by the C-3 program, including the chemical
treatment process used for fasteners. The program stopped using the treatment process, leading to
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greater wear on the parts and poor performance. Customers were complaining, so the program
looked for a way to address the issue and came up with three options:
1) Ignore the issue. The problem was largely aesthetic, and did not jeopardize the safety
of users or product so it could be avoided.
2) Complicated work-around. There were mechanical methods available to treat the
fasteners prior to use, but the process was "finicky" and inconsistent in its results.
3) Adopt M-1. M-1 was not an ideal solution in this case. Although the chemical
process would produce the desired effect, all uses in the past had been for small numbers
of large parts. Treating the fasteners on all C-3 products meant applying the process to
very large numbers of very small parts.
The C-3 program assessed their options for addressing the problem, and determined that M-1
provided technical superiority but insufficient production process development. Furthermore this
was a low priority problem and the cooperation required of the supplier could be problematic.
The C-3 program determined that the available solutions were too complicated and costly so they
didn't implement any of them. For two years they attempted to adjust their own process for better
results but were unsuccessful in achieving the desired improvements.
Adoption was finally driven by demands from an influential customer. The customer's
complaints drove the change through upper management, who gave the problem high priority and
allowed the program one year to get a solution into production. At that point, M- 1 was chosen
because it was more reliable than the alternatives. The technology was also considered low risk
because of the extensive work that had been done and the relative comfort of the materials and
process group with the technology.
There were several issues that made implementation difficult. As mentioned above, the
M-1 process was designed for use on a few large parts, not a large number of small parts. The
production process needed a redesign. The fasteners were also sourced from a single supplier,
and then distributed to suppliers around the world for use in multiple parts of the C-3 products.
The fastener supplier was converted to the new process so all the parts were treated, but the
tremendous amount of inventory in the supply chain meant that several years later, untreated
fasteners were still being used on new products. Suppliers using the fasteners could not always
differentiate between the new M- 1-treated fasteners and the old non-treated fasteners, so a mix of
fasteners continues to be used throughout the supply chain.
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The following diagram depicts the timing of development and transition activities and
illustrates the iterative nature of development in the later stages of the process.
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Figure 5: Illustration of M-1 Development Process & Timeline
5.3.2 Materials Project 2 (M-2): Adhesive Materials
M-2 technology is the incorporation of high performance materials into decals applied to
the surface of products. Unlike the M- technology, the M-2 program did not originate as a
research project. M-2 was a development project that led to radical innovation by combining new
materials discoveries with old technology to create capabilities that didn't previously exist. The
project followed an iterative development cycle in which the technology was developed and
incorporated into a product, and then testing and use led to discovery of new potential capabilities
that were developed and redeployed onto more products for additional uses. The development
team was successful in achieving adoption for its original targeted application, but unsuccessful
in achieving adoption in radical new uses. The development team believes the transition failed
because of inconvenient timing, insufficient cooperation and communication, and risk aversion
among potential adopting programs. The program believes the technology was not appropriate
for use on their product.
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Origination
The origin of M-2 development is difficult to pinpoint, because it evolved out of the use
of decals, which have been used to add small surface features to products for decades. The use of
decals has grown increasingly sophisticated as scientists developed more advanced adhesives and
superior materials. Over the past twenty years, as interest increased in developing alternatives to
the hazardous chemical processes necessary to apply paint to products on a large scale, decals
began to replace features that had previously been painted on the surface. Eventually, decal-like
applications were considered for the replacement of all painted features. M-2 technology was a
radical discovery that emerged from projects geared towards trying to replace paint with decal-
like applications.
Development Process
There have been numerous efforts to reduce the hazardous nature of paint, including
substitution by various water-based coatings that were not particularly effective and often used
improperly. Decals were an interesting new approach to the problem, but they required a
complete change in the production process for treating the exterior of a product because they
could not be sprayed on like paint, they needed to be applied. Paint replacement work was
pursued under internal R&D funding for a while, and the project progressed when funding was
obtained to demonstrate the technology on government contracted products.
While the use of decals as a paint replacement was pursued, the initial focus was
selecting the best material for paint replacement. When the development team began to
experiment with different materials and their properties, they discovered that they could introduce
many new properties into the material once they removed the need to spray it onto metal surfaces.
As a result, a new phase of development work began to take place, proceeding along two paths,
development of the adhesive to attach the materials to the products and development of the
properties and capabilities of the materials that would be adhered. This was a very iterative
development project in which many of the new uses were discovered during application and
testing of the technology. Most of the early development work was done cooperatively with the
suppliers that would provide the adhesives as well as some of the materials.
Initial Technology Transition
The G-2 program, part of the government products business unit, incorporated M-2 into
several products to test and prove the technology as a paint replacement. The customer's interest
drove adoption because of a cost-benefit study that demonstrated the economic advantage of
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using decals to replace paint, and incorporation into the G-2 products demonstrated technical
superiority over paint as a protective coating for the product. Customer interest, lower costs, and
higher performance led to incorporation on the next major product program developed by the
company's government products business unit, the G-3 program.
There was significant cooperative effort between the development team, the program, and
the end customer. During transition to the G-3 program, cooperative development and testing
was conducted to determine what type of material could be used in the decal to provide the best
substitute for paint, and to investigate which other properties could be incorporated to benefit the
product. This led to increased experimentation with different types of materials and their
properties. Unfortunately, the new G-3 program that adopted the technology was canceled when
it failed to win a government contract ensuring sales of the product.
Return to Development
After the G-3 product line was cancelled, development continued on the new materials
that had been developed for the decals. Testing of the materials had revealed surprising new
capabilities, which introduced a range of new potential applications for decals. The development
team continued to develop the ability to incorporate high performance materials into decals,
designated M-2, and investigated the potential for use of M-2 on multiple products. Eventually
they pitched the technology to designers on a new program in the commercial products business
unit.
Technology Transition II
The central R&D development team approached the C-4 program with the M-2
technology during the late design stages of a new product. The C-4 program was engaged in a
high profile new product development program and their technology needs were widely known
throughout the company through formal and informal communication among researchers,
developers, designers, and managers. The development team believed the program could benefit
from the properties offered by the M-2 technology, but the C-4 team was mostly unaware of the
new capability that M-2 had introduced. The program was amenable to considering the M-2
technology because one member of the product team had previously worked with the M-2
technology on the cancelled G-3 program and helped introduce M-2. Additionally, the C-4
program was still evaluating potential means of surface protection for their new product and was
willing to consider potential options.
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The C-4 program investigated the M-2 technology, and the technology performed
satisfactorily in trade studies so it was included in the initial product design pending a better
solution. The program continued to explore alternatives because M-2 was not a perfect fit, and
the program eventually decided not to adopt it for several reasons.
According to the C-4 team, the production process required for use of M-2 was
cumbersome and inconsistent and needed to happen at an inconvenient phase of production.
Durability of the M-2 adhesive was also problematic. Early versions of the technology did not
adhere well enough so there was a fear that they would peel off, leaving the product exposed.
Newer versions corrected this problem, creating an adhesive that was very difficult to remove, but
as a consequence very difficult to repair. This would cause high operating and maintenance costs
for customers, and the program was concerned about providing customers a product that could be
repaired quickly and easily.
Another important barrier to adoption was restrictions related to International Trade in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR restricts the use of technology developed for military use in
internationally traded commercial products. Some of the work that went into the development of
the M-2 technology was part of the G-3 design proposal, which took place under government
contract. In order to prevent ITAR restrictions, the development team had to prove satisfactorily
that the majority of the development work happened under internal R&D funding and posed no
threat to national security.
Timing was also an issue because the program waited until late in the product's design
before addressing the issue of surface protection. One member of the C-4 team acknowledged
that they "looked at this issue pretty late and had to make it work within constraints set by earlier
decisions. We might have had a better solution, more elegant, if we thought about it earlier."
Instead of M-2, the program selected a combination of alternative solutions that were widely used
throughout the industry and were considered standard techniques for surface protection for the
type of product they were designing. The development team was frustrated because they believed
that the program was missing out on important technical advantages that M-2 could provide.
Technology Transition III: Continued Opportunity
Continued development activity is aimed at new applications and at addressing the issues
that have prevented adoption in the past. Currently, the development team at central R&D is
working on a solution to a problem faced by a product currently in production by the government
products business unit. The program encountered an unanticipated problem with surface
protection once production had begun, and cannot proceed with production until the problem is
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solved. M-2 technology has an opportunity here, and will concentrate on extensive
communication with the program to address the need.
The following diagram illustrates the non-linear process that led to development and
transition of the M-2 technology.
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Figure 6: Illustration of M-2 Development Process & Timeline
5.3.3 Structures Project (S-1): Hybrid Composite Structure
S-al is a hybrid structure of composite and titanium in a novel design that supports higher
loads with lower mass. S-I came together as a convergence of four separate technologies, two of
which were old and widely used, and two that were less established or familiar at production
scale. Central R&D began experimenting with this type of hybrid structure in various
configurations on government products over the past twenty years, and finally reached a version
of the current configuration of the hybrid structure that was developed as part of the G-3 design
proposal in the late 1990s. This case illustrates the complexity of adapting multiple innovations
into a technological solution that is highly specific to the adopting program, especially when the
adopting program's priorities are changing over time. It also highlights the technology
opportunities that can be captured even when a product is cancelled.
Information on this development project was hard to obtain. The project was politically sensitive
because it was not yet complete despite the late stage of the product design. This made some
people reluctant to discuss the technology or the decisions that led to its development, then
cancellation, then resurrection. The people engaged in the project were also under extreme time
pressure and very difficult to schedule for interviews. Thus, the analysis of this project is based
on much less information than the other case studies.
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Development Process
The hybrid structure was developed to suit specific needs of one product after another,
each of which was cancelled before commercialization. For each iteration of S-I development,
the development work focused on adapting S- 1 to meet the product's specific needs. This was
important because S-1 wasn't a technology itself, but a unique way of integrating four different
technologies. Structural design is very specific to the product, and the product team's needs were
critical to determining the configuration of the technology in the structural elements.
Development was initially targeted for the G-3 product in the government products
business unit. Work under that program proved the advantages of using hybrid structure through
trade studies, so development work continued after the program was cancelled. The development
team marketed S-1 to the commercial business unit and it was incorporated by the next major
program in need of advanced structural design, the C-5. A great deal of work was done preparing
the hybrid structural design for use in that program's product design. Then that product line was
cancelled. The technology was incorporated into the next major commercial product design to
come up, the C-6. The C-6 team was interested in the technology because several members of the
C-6 design team had been on the C-5 design team prior to its cancellation. They were familiar
with the hybrid structural design and had incorporated it into designs before.
Funding for development was a major hurdle for the development team. All the early
work on the S-I technology was funded internally by central R&D, but it was difficult to fit the
project under a particular budget area. As a hybrid structure, the technology required cooperation
across several focus areas. It belonged to neither the titanium group nor the composite group,
each of which funded projects separately. The commercial business unit did not want to bear the
cost of development until the technology was sufficiently ready to move into the product design
phase.
Development of the technology reflected the needs of the C-6 program as they evolved.
Several critical development decisions were based on the program's early drive for low
production costs. In the early stages of development, material decisions (for example, which
elements of the structure would be made of composite vs. titanium) were based almost entirely on
cost, without as much consideration to other factors. However, as the program's priorities shifted
away from cost and towards specific performance attributes, the development objectives did not
keep pace and soon the team was working on a hybrid structure that no longer met the needs of
the program. Despite the advanced work and long commitment to development of the
technology, the hybrid structure technology was cut from the product design.
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With limited funding availability and no target program, the development project was all
but cancelled. One member of the development team continued to work on it part time, because
there was belief among the R&D group that the hybrid structural design was promising and
would find the right target eventually, but there was no drive to develop it to production
readiness.
Technology Transfer
After canceling use of the central R&D group's hybrid structure technology, the C-6
program contracted an external supplier to provide the parts that would have used the S-I
technology. Two and a half years later, the supplier came back with a part that did not meet cost
or performance requirements, creating a major problem for the C-6 program. They could not use
the supplier's design and were unable to achieve a satisfactory part using traditional structural
design. The program contacted central R&D again, and the project was resurrected with a new
set of priorities. Development work resumed, but this time under intense time pressure. There
was no need to market the product's needs to R&D or to market the technology's capabilities to
the program; both were aware of the other by this point.
Faced with few alternatives, the program was willing to take the risk of adopting the new
hybrid structure technology despite the fact that it was not production ready and applied old
technological methods in a truly novel fashion. Also, despite the stringent cost and performance
requirements for the part that would incorporat the technology, it was a part that presented little
risk to the product's overall performance. High risk technology was easier for the program to
accept into the low risk parts. To transition the technology, a cross functional team was created
from central R&D and the commercial business unit with oversight by high level management.
The following diagram illustrates the convergence of multiple technologies developed at
different times into a single application.
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Figure 7: Illustration of S-1 Development Process & Timeline
5.3.4 Structures Project 2 (S-2): Structurally Integrated Electronics
S-2 is a project to incorporate electronic features into the structural design of a product,
rather than adding electronics in as a separate parasitic system on top of the structural design. It
incorporates advanced electronic capabilities and design as well as novel approaches to structural
design to achieve new functionality. The resulting designs are smaller and lighter, so more
complex designs are feasible within the same space as previous structures. This project was
strategically planned to incorporate vendors, customers, and a multi-disciplinary team throughout
the development process. It used a highly collaborative process with constant communication
among the development team and potential customers, and incorporated multiple milestones with
frequent testing.
Origination
S-2 development began because of customer interest in increased electronics
functionality. The program manager of S-2 has a 20 year history of work in electronics and an
extensive network among customers and researchers. He noted observation of the need for a
project of this type among designers and developers for several years, but indicated that it was
never pursued because the costs of developing the technology to integrate electronics into
structural design were perceived to be too high. He noted a general sentiment among customers
that if the technology was available, certain functions and features would be feasible for new
products that couldn't otherwise be accomplished. Work began on incorporating the electronics
into the structural design in new ways around 1995, when the cost of electronics development had
begun to come down and the value of the technology to new programs began to increase.
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Development Process
Development of S-2 began with a marketing phase that was followed by an innovation
phase. The marketing phase took place with close cooperation between central R&D and the Air
Force Research Lab (AFRL) to put together a program and a plan for development. The AFRL
and the development team agreed that there was a need for the technology and acknowledged that
the Air Force would ultimately be a significant customer for products that incorporated the
technology, so early discussions about design priorities were crucial in planning the technology
development project.
Eventually the AFRL published a request for proposals (RFP), seeking potential projects
in this area that could be funded to promote the technology. Early communication with the
AFRL was essential because the requirements for the RFP were not written yet and there was still
room to influence them. The Air Force works with many research groups like this company's
central R&D organization to shape the requirements, because groups that are engaged in the
development tend to have a good sense of what is feasible and what requirements are realistic.
The company also gained an advantage in this phase by making the customer aware of their
capabilities and availability. The AFRL knew who would bid on their RFP because they were
familiar with the capabilities of firms throughout the industry by the time the RFP was released.
Despite heated competition with other firms in the industry, the company won the AFRL contract
to develop one of their proposals.
Pulling the team together to create a proposal for the RFP required that the R&D group
determine which elements of the development project would be worked internally and which
elements would be shared with contractors and suppliers. The team was selected to represent a
mix of internal and external expertise. Even internally, the team was very diverse due to the
multidisciplinary nature of the project and the fact that manufacturing was included from the
beginning. There was a clear understanding that the ability to manufacture the technology at low
cost was critical to the success of the project.
According to a member of the team, there were two ways to build the team: choose
vendors based on the capabilities needed to achieve a particular design, or choose a design based
on the capabilities of the available vendors. Since the vendors would be chosen before the
design, the second method was pursued. An external supplier was selected as a partner for the
electronics design over the internal electronics group. The partner was chosen on the basis of
proven expertise in the area and a good working relationship that had been established through
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other collaborative projects. There were two major issues under negotiation with the supplier,
technology and contracting.
Early on, the R&D group was supporting two parallel competing proposals in this
technology area. The technology was considered to be high-risk, because according to the
program manager, the goal was to substantially advance technology in a way that a low risk
project cannot achieve. The initial brainstorming phase generated about 20 concepts, which were
reduced down to three promising ideas for lab testing. The team developed a scorecard based on
customer requirements, cost, and performance.
The development strategy for the project was a "build a little, test a little" approach.
Testing first occurred at the element level, then at the subcomponent level, the component level,
and finally a full scale test of the technology integrated into a prototype product. The team's
many smaller milestones were tracked in weekly meetings among the central R&D team and
monthly meetings with the full team, including customer and suppliers. Frequent testing and
feedback ensured that the development stayed on course and that unfeasible concepts were not
pursued too far without a check. The program was victim to multiple slips in cost and schedule
as more was learned about the complexity of the technology and the limitations of the suppliers.
The central R&D development team owns all the technology that they develop under this
contract, which includes the structural design and bonding technology, while the supplier owns
everything they design in the electronics space. As a development partner, the Air Force tests and
approves the technology, but doesn't own anything. The Air Force has the right to use the
technology, and the company will sell it to them by putting it into products that they purchase
through the government products division or by licensing it to other companies to incorporate into
products. There has been some struggle to reach agreement on this, because every organization
involved would like more control or ownership of the technology.
Technology Transition
Development did not begin by targeting a single program, but by targeting a capability
that could drive new programs based on the increased functionality that would become available.
Starting from scratch allows the development team to optimize the technology for capability
without having to design complex workarounds of incumbent systems. The alternative would be
to approach current programs with the opportunity to improve their capabilities, but the current
line of products are already heavily loaded with electronics and would require significant system
redesign in order to incorporate the S-2 technology.
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The development team is currently in the process of transitioning the technology to a new
product program in the government products business unit. Rather than the development team
working directly with the customer to sell the technology, the development team is working to
transition the technology into product development. The product development team is designing
a new product concept that will be marketed to the customer. To ensure a smooth transition to
the product development team in the government business unit, a member of the technology
development team has been transferred into that organization to coordinate incorporation of the
technology into product design.
5.3.5 Tools Project (T-1): Structural Design Software
The T- 1 project was developed to provide a common computer aided design tool for use
throughout the company. The tool incorporated the needs of various product design groups
engaged in the design of products for diverse markets and uses. The tool was designed to be
flexible and responsive and easily adapt to multiple uses. This development process was
collaborative and iterative, relying on structured feedback from multiple target customers
throughout development.
Origination
The tool was developed to replace three incompatible legacy software systems in use
across the company. The use of multiple tools was a residual effect from the merger activity that
had built up the company over the last decade and the tools had not been replaced when the
acquired companies were integrated into the firm. The push to create a single system for use
across the organization came from a group within central R&D that was engaged in the
development of tools for lean manufacturing. The aim was to create a system that could allow
cooperative development among all organizations within the company. If all design engineers
could communicate with each other, the expected result was more collaborative design
opportunities.
Development Process
Development was initiated within the central R&D group with a team of three people that
eventually grew to about six. The design leadership team included software designers as well as
design engineers who had used and were familiar with one or more of the legacy design software
systems. The project was also developed in a triad structure among engineering (meaning the
engineers who use the design tool), business, and development. This team continued to lead the
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development of the system, even as the number of people involved in building the software grew
and the number of programs involved in providing feedback increased.
The initial development of the system was based on one of the company's legacy
systems, which was determined to be the most comprehensive and flexible of the systems in use
at the time. The new software was developed and launched as a pilot program for use within one
small segment of the commercial business unit in order to have a cooperative and interactive
development process. The development team worked closely with the sponsor of the pilot and
was very responsive to the needs of the sponsoring organization, even while trying to develop a
flexible system that could be used throughout the firm later.
The development began with basic functions that all design engineers would need to use,
and later moved into more complex functions or product-specific needs. As each function was
added, it was tested by engineers in the pilot program and feedback was used to fine-tune the
tool's performance. According to a member of the development team, the pilot phase allowed the
project to shift from development by a few people who thought they knew what everyone needed
to a customer-driven development process. The early users struggled a lot with the tool, but their
contributions to the development created a dynamic solution. During the pilot phase, there was
no system in place to collect feedback and respond, so adjustments were made to the tool on an
ad-hoc basis whenever problems were reported to the development team. This occurred
frequently.
When additional programs became involved, the development team organized a feedback
structure that provided interaction between the programs and the software developers. Each
program had a designated lead that was responsible for collecting feedback and communicating it
to the development team. The development team had designated individuals who understood the
needs of design engineers and could translate the programs' collected feedback into software
functionality.
Initial funding came from the central R&D group and from the program that adopted the
pilot. As the development project expanded to incorporate feedback and collaboration from other
organizations across the firm, those groups provided additional funding to support incorporation
of their own needs into the tool. After three years of development, the project was supported by
eleven separate sources of funding.
Technology Transfer Events
The first transition event was from the early development team to the pilot sponsoring
organization. The organization accepted the pilot because the program needed to train several
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engineers on a new system and management realized the long term need for use of a single
system across the firm. There were risks inherent in adopting a new tool but there would be
limitations in training new engineers on old systems that were likely to be replaced eventually
anyway. In this way, management could get ahead of the curve by embracing the new tool during
the development phase and influencing the functionality of that tool.
Early adopters of the technology were recruited through road shows of the technology
and a lot of selling and persuasion by the development team. The goal was to recruit a few
people within each organization to accept the technology and then use those people as
representatives to their organizations. However, many of the adoptions into programs occurred
when the program's legacy system became inadequate for the sophisticated design work that was
needed. The programs looked for replacement tools and were persuaded to adopt the T-1 tool
because of the potential to influence the development and to cooperate across the firm,
advantages not offered by alternative off-the-shelf software tools. As each new program adopted
the technology, the development team became aware of additional needs that had not been
anticipated. The tool continued to develop in response to programs' needs.
Despite the opportunity to offer feedback and influence development, there was
significant resistance from the engineers who needed to adopt the tool and from the managers
who would make the decision to adopt it across a program. The engineers resisted because they
wanted a tool that was perfect, and the tool had considerable problems, especially in the
beginning. Managers resisted for various reasons, including the fact that the system was not
backwards compatible with old designs. The engineers could not use the system to update old
designs without first recreating the designs in the new software.
Interviews with users of the tool indicated that it is not yet being used on a broad scale
across the company. Almost every program in both the commercial products and government
products organization had adopted it in some way, but many are using only in functions where
they lack an alternative option and not for their day to day work. The most common reason is
that the tool is not mature enough yet to convert everyone over; but many adopters indicated that
the tool will be used eventually. Timing will depend on functionality and whether the legacy
tools continue to be sufficient to complete the work.
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manufacturing budget for developmentintegrated tool system
Additional funding from tool Continuous development
Need to replace multiple development budget and frequent 
upgrades
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Figure 8: Illustration of T-1 Development Process & Timeline
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M-1: Chemical Treatment Process
Strategic Goal Reduced Environmental Hazard, Improved Performance Origination Basic research; internal expertise - 1992
Funding Internal and External Development Parallel development towards commercial, government applications
Transitions G-1 Program - 1997 Northeast Site - 2002 Southwest Site - 2003 C-3 Program - 2003
Reason for Transition Technical Performance Superior to Standard Process Superior to Standard Process Process Failure
Transition Criteria Trade Studies, Production Process Trade Studies, Opportunity Trade Studies, Opportunity Trade Studies, Production Process
Communication Networking Marketing, Networking Marketing, Networking Program Search, Networking
Alternative Expensive Production Line Inferior Process Inferior Process Poor Performance
Barriers to Adoption Technology not Mature Changing Specs Changing Specs Vendor Cooperation
Did Adoption Occur? yes yes yes yes
Best Practices Early engagement of customer, parallel internal/externally funded work, matching capability with strategic goals, providing customer support.
Problem Behaviors Allowed adoption before maturity.
M-2: Adhesive Materials
Strategic Goal Reduced Environmental Hazard, Improved Performance Origination Modification of common technology, contributions from applied research - mid 1980s
Funding Internal and External Development Iterative development in cooperation with supplier and product teams
Transitions G-2 Program - 1998 G-3 Program - 2001 C-4 Program - 2006
Reason for Transition Superior to standard process Superior to standard process New performance feature
Transition Criteria Cost-Benefit Analysis Cost-Benefit Analysis Trade Studies, Production Process
Communication Collaborative Development Collaborative Development Marketing, Networking
Alternative Standard Process Standard Process, Reduced Perf. Standard Process
Barriers to Adoption Risk Aversion External (Product Cancelled) Technology not mature/suitable
Did Adoption Occur? yes/for demonstration, testing yes/product later cancelled no
Best Practices Early engagement of customers (G-2, G-3), Capturing new discoveries
Problem Behaviors Promoted adoption before maturity, limited marketing & collaboration, too much external funding (ITAR restrictions)
S-1: Hybrid Structure
Strategic Goal
Funding
Transitions
Reason for Transition
Transition Criteria
Communication
Alternative
Barriers to Adoption
Did Adoption Occur?
Best Practices
Problem Behaviors
Spatially and Economically Efficient Design
Internal
G-3 Program - 1998
Superior Technical Performance
Technical Performance
Collaborative Development
Alternative Design
Design priorities
yes/product later cancelled
Origination
Development
C-5 Program - 2000
Superior Technical Performance
Technical Performance
Collaborative Development
Alternative Design
External (Product Cancelled)
yes/product later cancelled
Integration of multiple technical innovations (some familiar, some new) - mid 1990s
Cooperative development with programs
C-6 Program - 2002, 2005
Superior Technical Performance
Technical Performance, Production Cost
Collaborative Development
Alternative Design (Outsourced)
Design priorities
yes
Putting high-risk technology in low-risk part, Persistence in development
Funding struggles, insufficient coordination with customer (C-6), changing customer priorities, pressure to outsource
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S-2: Structurall Inte rated Electronics
Strategic Goal Spatially and Economically Efficient Design Origination Integration of multiple technical innovations, multidisciplinary - late 1990s
Funding Internal and External Development Cooperative cross-discipline development with customer, suppliers
Transitions Projected: G-X Program (new program) - 2010
Reason for Transition New technology driving new type of product
Transition Criteria Technology maturity concurrent with market development for new product
Communication Weekly with team, supplier; monthly with customer
Alternative No new product
Barriers to Adoption Anticipated: Technical, production
Did Adoption Occur? pending adoption
Best Practices Engaging customers early, frequent communication, long runway for high-risk development
Problem Behaviors Too much external funding (potential for ITAR restrictions), pressure to outsource (bad supplier behavior)
T-1: New Software Tool
0
0
0
ON
Common design tool for use across multiple divisions
Multiple internal organizations
Pilot - 2004
Legacy system obsolete
Technical Performance, Features
Continuous Feedback
Standard Commercial Software
Errors, Risk of non-adoption by other
programs
yes
Origination
Development
G-2 - 2005
Legacy system obsolete
Technical Performance, Features
Structured Feedback System
Standard Commercial Software
Errors
yes
Based on current system - early 2000s
Iterative development beginning with pilot program
G-7 - 2005 C-6 -
Needed new features, capability Neede
Technical Performance, Features Techn
Structured Feedback System Struct
Development to add features Devel
Current system works Curre
yes
2007
ed new features, capability
ical Performance, Features
ured Feedback System
opment to add features
nt system works
yes
Collaborative development, use of pilot program, structured feedback system
Customers had to use early versions with errors, problems, hurt reputation
Strategic Goal
Funding
Transitions
Reason for Transition
Transition Criteria
Communication
Alternative
Barriers to Adoption
Did Adoption Occur?
Best Practices
Problem Behaviors
[This page is intentionally blank]
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6 Case Studies: Discussion and Recommendations
Throughout the observation and analysis of these five case studies, a number of recurring
factors seemed to influence the development process and the way transition from central R&D to
product business unit was handled. The projects were shaped by the way they were conceived
and selected for development, the phase of development at which the company became involved
in the technology, the type of innovation that was expected from the project, the frequency and
sophistication of communication among the development team, their customers, and their
suppliers, and the level of cooperation among those groups. The success of transition was further
affected by the timing of the introduction of the technology to the product team, with respect to
the stage of development of the products that were targeted. This section will provide a
discussion of each of those factors and recommendations for addressing them in a way that
improves the potential for successful transition.
6.1 Project Origination
Projects originate when there is recognition of a capability worth further development or
when a goal is identified that requires a technical solution. Successful technology development
occurs when the right capability is selected and developed to meet a strategic technology goal.
The challenge is determining which capabilities are worth developing and which technology
goals can realistically be met, and matching them with each other. For this matching to occur, the
organization (or the management of the organization) needs to be aware of the technical expertise
of their employees and the capabilities of the organization.
The following matrix summarizes the capabilities developed and the goals targeted by
each of the cases studied, as well as the means by which the match of capabilities with goals were
achieved. M-2 is treated as two separate cases for this purpose, because the characteristics of the
development process were significantly different before and after the discovery of new functional
capabilities.
Project Origination
Project M-1 M-2 - Initial M-2 - Eventual S-1 S-2 T-1
Capabilities Internal Expertise Industry Expertise New Discovery, Internal Expertise, Internal Expertise, Internal Expertise
Supplier Industry Expertise Supplier Expertise
Expertise, Internal
Goals Environmentally Environmentally Enhanced Efficient Structure Efficient Structure, Efficient Design,
Benign Process Benign Process Functionality New Functionality Processes
Matching General General General General Customer Contact,
Awareness Awareness, Awareness Awareness Funding Available
Funding Available I
Figure 11: Comparison of Case Studies in Project Origination Characteristics
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The M-1 and M-2 projects addressed the goal of reducing environmental hazard in
production processes and were also tied to other goals of improving production efficiency and
enhancing product performance. S-I and S-2 sought to improve the performance of products
through more spatially, operationally and economically efficient design. T- 1 was aimed at more
efficient and effective production. However, the strategic goals addressed by the project were not
always explicit and well known by the members of the development team. Not every member of
the development teams discussed the goals of their projects on a strategic level; instead they often
defined the project goals only by the specific tactical issues addressed.
Without a clear awareness of the technological goals of the organization, there is risk of
pursuing projects simply because the resources are available or because individuals in the
organization possess an interest or expertise in a technology area. In order to know what they
should be doing and connect it to what they can do, there needs to be an explicit and prolific
articulation of the strategic goals of the organization and explicit designation of the goals each
project is addressing.
Recommendations: Build awareness of expertise and capabilities that are available
in the organization. Know what expertise is available and what is missing. Make strategic
goals explicit and widely known.
6.2 Phase of Development at Project Initiation
Some projects arise out of basic scientific research, while some build on established
technological developments from within the company's own development organization or from
suppliers, partners, or academic organizations. The phase of maturity at which the company
engages in the project depends on what technology is available, on what technology is needed to
meet the project goal, and on the timeframe available for development. The following table
summarizes these characteristics for the cases studied:
Phase of Development at Proji ct Initiation
Project M-1 M-2 - Initial M-2 - Eventual S-1 S-2 T-1
Phase of Project Basic Research Development Applied Research Development Applied Research Development
at Initiation
State of the Art No comparable Industry-wide New discovery, Technical Expertise available Standard software
technology knowledge of new capabilities elements in in sub-elements packages
available technology various but no comparable available
Timeline to 10+ years 5 years Attempted at -5 1-2 years 10-15 years -2 years
Transition years
Figure 12: Comparison of Case Studies in Development Phase at Initiation
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In the table, "Basic Research" refers to scientific research conducted within the
organization, while "Applied Research" and "Development" refer to projects that built on earlier
research conducted internally or by external organizations.
The M-l project began in a research phase that was academic in nature, and engagement
in the early basic research appears to have contributed to the project's success. It was because of
the scientific expertise and experience that the project secured early development funding from
the AFRL. According to developers on the project, the team's prior research was important in
winning the AFRL contract:
"There were several competitive proposals. Others were earlier stage and didn't have
production input, so they were willing to try riskier, sexier ideas. [Our] idea was more
expensive and not as creative. It didn't have the short term appeal and attractiveness, but
had better long term prospects because of the years already spent developing the
technology and more production experience. [We] had more awareness of what was
realistic and possible."
It is not clear whether the company would have funded technology development in this area
eventually, even without the early academic investigation of the chemistry, but the early stage
work made a major contribution.
However, this is not necessarily evidence that research projects should originate in basic
science. M-2 did not originate with academic research conducted within the company, but was
able to harness academic research, combine it with internal capabilities and collaborate with
suppliers to develop a new technology. S-1, and T-l were based on technology that was in a
more mature stage of development when the company began to work with it, because there was
already research available that met the needs of the project.
The S-I project was an integrative use of many scientific and technological discoveries,
and most work that took place should be classified as applied research or development. The
development work relied on basic research that had occurred both within the company and
externally over several decades. There was no single technological advance that drove the
technology; it was driven by complex interaction among various technologies. The S-2 project
was in slightly less advanced phase of applied research. The technology was drawn from
multiple achievements in several technology areas, including electronics and computing,
materials science, manufacturing technology, and structural design. There was no new basic
research needed to achieve the technological advancement, but integration of the different
technology areas was accomplished in a completely novel way. The T-1 project was a
development project. No new technological discoveries were necessary to develop the tool, but a
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thorough understanding of the increasing complexity of the development work in the firm's
programs was necessary.
The M-1 project started as basic research because the expertise within the organization
was truly novel and could not be acquired from elsewhere. The other projects took advantage of
the state of the technology throughout the industry. The projects that addressed near term goals
(M-2, S-1, T-1) were most reliant on available technology and began in the development phase,
while the projects that had less urgency or more novel technology began in earlier phases.
Determining what stage of development is appropriate at the initiation of a project requires clear
understanding of the goals of the project, awareness of the timeframe in which the technology has
to be available, and knowledge of the technological resources that exist internally and externally.
Initiation into projects of earlier, less mature phases of technological development should be
justified by ties to long term strategic goals because of the long time they will spend in
development before becoming useful.
Recommendations: Know what is available both within the organization and
externally. Know the strategic technology goals and the state of the art in those areas.
Understand the timeline available for development.
6.3 Type of Innovation
Whether a transition will be successful depends, in part, on the type of innovation,
because the importance of the innovation to the adopting project will vary dramatically depending
on the type of innovation. The willingness of the adopting program to make accommodations for
incremental innovations may be higher because the risk profile is lower, but incremental
innovations may not drive enough performance improvement or cost savings to justify disruption
of current production processes. On the other hand, radical innovations may face a greater hurdle
in gaining acceptance by an adopting program, but are more likely to create dramatic
improvements or drive new business opportunities that justify rethinking production processes
and product design.
The following figure depicts the type of innovation of each case studied, as well as the
risk of technological success and the risk level of the product targeted for transition. It also
shows the reward that the adopting program can expect from the technology and its resulting
urgency of adoption.
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Risk - Reward Profile of Projects
Project M-1 M-2 - Initial M-2 - Eventual IS-1 S-2 T-1
Type of Incremental incremental Radical Innovation Radical Innovation Radical Innovation Incremental
Innovation Innovation Innovation Innovation
Risk - Technology Low Medium High High Very High Low
Risk - Program Varies; mostly low- Medium High; performance Low; used in part High; new Varies; decreasing
risk uses critical once with low functional products driven by over time as more
incorporated risk this innovation programs adopt
Advantage to Lower cost, Lower cost, Completely new Lower cost, Completely new Greater staffing
Program improved improved capability improved capability flexibility
performance performance performance
Urgency of Low except in G-1; Moderate Low; significant High; although Moderate; High in programs
Adoption need to wait for resistance from C- initial urgency was willingness to with limited
opportunities to 4 program low adopt technology alternative, low in
change when it is ready programs happy
engineering with current
drawings system
Figure 13: Comparison of Case Studies' Risk Reward Profiles
The type of innovation for the M- 1 project was low risk and an incremental improvement
on existing technologies. While the process for applying the chemistry was very innovative, it
was used to address chemical treatment of metal alloys, a problem that had been solved many
times in many other ways. The technology itself was unlikely to drive new businesses or change
the company's approach to product design. Instead, it was an enabler of better, more efficient
design at lower cost and less significant environmental hazard. In some ways, this inhibited
transition because programs didn't see a big enough advantage to disrupt production in order to
switch to the new technology. This was the case in every transition except for the first. A more
revolutionary advance in performance might have justified the switch earlier for many programs.
On the other hand, the low risk nature of the innovation made it easier for programs to adopt the
technology when they had an opportunity to do so.
For M-2, the type of innovation moved from low risk, incremental development in the
first stage to higher risk radical innovation over the course of the project. During the early stages
of development, when M-2 was considered as a paint replacement, the technology was an
incremental improvement over the state of the art. Instead of spraying a feature onto a surface,
the M-2 technology allowed the material to be applied directly in a single sheet. While this
opened a lot of opportunity for the programs to reduce the costs and hazards of a spray process
for paint application, it was not enough to drive new products or new business. The project
increased its risk profile when new properties were added, introducing new capabilities that
changed the behavior of the product and the ways in which new products could be developed.
The technology became more integral to the product's performance and was no longer peripheral
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or aesthetic like it was in the paint replacement use. The technology was more easily adopted
earlier in its development and programs had a harder time adopting as the risk level increased.
The S-I hybrid structure was a more radical innovation. Using combinations of materials
in new and different ways provided entirely new platforms for the design of complex parts.
Lower weight and higher strength provided increased capability to the design team, and allow for
increased functionality of the products. This also resulted in a higher level of risk for the
technology. It relied on multiple things working and interacting properly to ensure success, and
required extensive collaboration to achieve the integration of technologies properly. The part of
the product that was able to incorporate the technology with a short development timeline was not
integral to the product's performance; this increased the product design team's willingness to
adopt the technology despite its unproven performance at that point.
The S-2 project is also a radical innovation, because it integrates many technological
developments in a new way to enable completely new functionality in product design. The
primary difference between S-1 and S-2 is that S-2 is integral to the overall design of the product
because it incorporates structural design and electronic systems, unlike S- 1 which can be added
into design in a relatively modular way, contained within a single part. S-2 needs to be integrated
into the overall product design, requiring design of entirely new products in order to use the
technology. There has not been much effort to get S-2 adopted by existing products. There is a
high level of risk to the technology, but a high potential reward if it can drive an entirely new
product line.
The T- 1 tool was an incremental innovation. It built on the technology of a legacy
software system and did not require any radical innovation or new discovery. The development
was low risk from a technological standpoint, but there was risk to the adopting programs. The
early adopters ran the risk of converting to a tool that would fail to be accepted across the firm,
eliminating the primary advantage of firm-wide cooperation that would result from adoption.
There was also substantial cost to the early adopters whose work was slowed considerably as time
was spent using a tool that did not quite work. As the development proceeded and more
programs adopted the tool, the level of risk was reduced.
The type of innovation will shape the willingness of a program to adopt. The level of risk
in the project should be balanced with the potential advantage that the technology can offer, and
the development team should consider the targeted adopting program's appetite for risk. The
cases studied showed that high risk innovations had trouble transitioning to products that were
already in production or advanced development, unless they could be incorporated into a non-
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integral part of the product. They had more success with new products, although several of those
new products were later cancelled.
Recommendations: Balance risk level with advantage to the program. Seek
opportunities to introduce high risk technology in low risk areas, or new programs.
6.4 Communication and Marketing
Communication between the development team and the adopting program is absolutely
critical to ensure a transition of the technology. There are formal and informal communication
channels, and both are of major importance. Formal communication channels include scheduled
collaboration and transition meetings between R&D and the product teams, technical conferences
or forums both within the company and through external organizations, and marketing efforts
made by the development teams towards the product groups. Informal communication takes
place among networks of employees who used to work together, transferred among projects or
programs, or have contact through other venues. These modes of communication are important
throughout the development process, from project planning through development, during
transition, and post-transition support.
The following chart attempts to characterize the level of communication that took place
at each stage of the development process for the cases studied.
Communication in Project Development
Project M-1 M-2 - Initial M-2 - Eventual S-1 S-2 T-1
Planning Phase Moderate Frequent, Limited Moderate Frequent, Collaborative with
Communication collaborative collaborative pilot, limited with
other orgs
Development Moderate, Frequent, Limited Moderate, Frequent, Increased with
Phase increasing over collaborative increasing over collaborative time, included
Communication time time more orgs
Pre-transition Heavy marketing, Heavy marketing, Limited, Some awareness Heavy marketing, Selective
Technology good awareness good awareness misunderstanding good awareness marketing
Awareness among parties
Transition Phase Frequent, Frequent, Frequent, but not Limited at first, Frequent, Frequent,
Communication collaborative collaborative collaborative became frequent collaborative collaborative
& collaborative
Support Phase Frequent, Frequent, N/A N/A N/A Frequent,
Communication responsive responsive responsive
Figure 14: Comparison of Case Studies in Communication Characteristics
On the M- 1 project, communication was frequent, continuous and flowed in both
directions. Early on, the development team used both formal and informal channels of
communication to publicize the capabilities of their technology, built a network of experts and
users, and continuously incorporated feedback from their customers. The formal communication
occurred because the team set clear project milestones and continuously made progress against
those milestones. They were then able to communicate progress to the organization and maintain
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an awareness of the availability of their technology. They also actively contacted programs to
learn about their needs and demonstrate the use of the M- 1 technology in applicable areas.
Informal communication occurred through employee networks that developed when people
moved among projects and shared their experience. The fact that most program personnel could
not remember precisely how they found out about the technology but cite numerous sources of
information flow indicates that communication was continuous and pervasive. This continuous
two way communication with the programs helped encourage and support transitions, and also
helped to sustain the program.
Communication between the M-2 development team and the C-4 program was not
sufficient to establish understanding of the program's needs and the technology's potential. The
R&D team developed the M-2 technology with the belief that the highest priority for a solution
was technical competence. However, there were several available solutions that met the technical
requirements, so the C-4 product design team's highest priority in selecting a solution was
compatibility with the production process and ease of repair. When M-2 did not meet these
criteria, the C-4 program chose an alternative option. The C-4 team acknowledged that with
further development, M-2 technology could have been a viable option. The development team
was extremely frustrated by the technical concerns, because they believed they could have made
different tradeoffs in the design that would change the results to meet the program's
requirements.
There was limited some informal communication between M-2 and C-4 through
employees that had worked on both the R&D team; and the product team. There were also
attempts to create formal communication channels, but there was not enough attention to this
effort to prevent a great deal of miscommunication. The perception within central R&D is that
the C-4 team didn't look at the right data and didn't understand the technology adequately. R&D
perceived a "not invented here" attitude within the commercial division, while the C-4 team
perceived central R&D as too secretive with their technology. It is not clear that increased
communication would have ensured a transition; M-2 may not have been the right technical
solution for C-4. However, openness during the development process would have helped both
teams to be better aware of whether the transition should even be attempted.
The S-1 project also suffered from insufficient communication between R&D and the
product team. The first attempt to adapt the technology for C-6 did not keep pace with shifts in
the program's priorities. The development team explained that the program's requirements were
very unclear from the beginning, and changes to requirements were brought to their attention
somewhat haphazardly. The development team indicated that this lack of communication and
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poorly defined requirements was not typical of product development in the commercial business
unit, and instead seemed to be a problem specific to the group responsible for this product feature.
The same lack of communication allowed an external vendor to spend two years designing a part
that didn't meet requirements. After several failed attempts to find the right technology to meet
their requirements, the product group increased communication with R&D substantially as they
pursue the new iteration of the hybrid structure to meet the part requirements for C-4.
On the S-2 project, communication was a major area of focus for the project manager,
who ensured that communication was frequent and information flowed from the customer to the
developers and from the developers back to the customer. All members of the development team
were aware of shifts in priorities, development of capabilities, roadblocks and setbacks, and
milestone accomplishments. Changes to the development plan were agreed upon by all parties
involved. A similar project planning approach helped the T-1 project integrate successfully. The
T- 1 development team was extremely successful at developing communication channels and
engaging in cooperative development across the company. Regular communication flowed
through designated channels from engineers to point people on the program teams and from the
program point people to the development team. Communication was not just received; the
program responded regularly to feedback from the program teams and used the information to
enhance the development process. The development team included both tool users (design
engineers) and tool designers (software engineers) and had the support of company management.
M-2 and S-1 both suffered a lack of regular, structured communication, while S-2 and T-
1 benefited greatly from regularly scheduled and organized communication. Secrecy and
protection of intellectual "turf" prevent awareness of technological capabilities when they reach
maturity, whereas early proliferation of data and results has helped facilitate smoother transitions.
Openness early in the development process allows for feedback from potential customers and can
shape a more robust technology. It is also clear that all of the technology transitions were
influenced by informal communication through a network of employees who had moved among
technology programs or product teams.
Recommendations: Begin communication with targeted customers early. Publicize
development through conferences, publications, or internal technology forums. Plan
structured communication with transition targets. Take advantage of employee networks
among programs.
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6.5 Transition Timing
Timing of transition and cooperative development seems to be one of the trickiest aspects
of the handoff from R&D to the product teams. Transition activity isn't always an explicit
responsibility of either group. If the development team does too much of the work to prepare the
technology for transition, the technology can end up far from the requirements that the product
team needs. However, if the development team hands off a technology that is not ready for use,
expecting the product team to complete development to suit their use, it is likely to be rejected by
the product team.
Timing of the handoff is also difficult when the technology development and product
development reach maturity at different rates. Problems can arise from attempting a transition an
immature technology late in the product development cycle. This occurred on both the M-1 and
M-2 projects. S-2 avoided this problem by targeting new product programs that are only in the
early concept phase. The goal is to reach technological maturity before the products reach a
mature development stage.
Another timing issue that occurs is when an immature technology is needed to meet a
deficiency. If a program has no other technical solution, they might be willing to adopt an
immature technology and adapt it for their use. This can accelerate technological development,
provide funding and support for a development project, and ensure that the technology gets used.
However, there are also negative repercussions of accelerating development this way.
The M-1 project provides a good illustration of some of the problems that can occur due
to accelerated transition. The sudden pull from the G- 1 program caused acceleration from
applied research into development and adoption. This introduced a number of issues:
* Overshot Specifications. According to the M- 1 development team, the
chemistry was easy to adapt to the G- I's needs, but the technology wasn't necessarily
well-suited to the use the program required. There was more functionality to the
chemical treatment process than what was needed, but the process specifications were
designed around the greater functionality. This set a tough precedent for future use of M-
1 process on the G-1 program.
o Workaround of Technology Qualification Process. In order to meet the short
term needs of the program, the team used a workaround instead of the normal process for
qualifying the technology. This led to several issues in adopting the technology further
into the program. While there were multiple additional potential uses, a new workaround
would have to be done for each use, or the technology would have to be re-qualified
according to the official method to facilitate future use.
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* No Specification for M-1 Process. Engineering designs referred to the process
by the brand name used by the licensed vendor, rather than by specifications. Other
companies collaborating on the G-l project did not want to incorporate the technology
into any parts they produced or used because they could not develop their own competing
technology without specifications to meet. After several adoptions and adaptations, the
team developed a general specification and qualified vendors to supply the necessary
technology. The company provided a non-exclusive license of the technology to vendors.
Timing is difficult because of the high level of uncertainty in technology development.
Coordinating technology development with product development is not even possible in many
cases; this requires patience. Need to balance between readiness, needs. M-1 timing was better
at timing subsequent transitions, particularly the transitions to the NE and SW sites. The
technology was prepared for transition with the help of the site team, and then both teams were
patient until an appropriate need came along to drive use of M-1 on a product.
Recommendations: Transition activity should be shared by R&D and the product
teams; neither group can do it independently. Match the maturity level of the technology to
the maturity level of the target product. Be patient and wait for the right opportunity to
match the technology to a need.
6.6 Unplanned Events
Unplanned events and factors not controlled by the development process play an
important role in the success of technology transition. These factors include cancellation of a
product or product line that was scheduled to adopt a technology, discovery of new potential
technologies, introduction of unexpected competition, and behavior of vendors. A robust
research and development process allows for some uncertainty in the development of technology.
The cancellation of products prevented transition of technology in several of the cases
studied. In the case of M-2, the first significant use of the technology was planned for the G-3
program, which was cancelled. Development of the technology continued after program
cancellation because the technology was not developed for that particular product, but to meet a
strategic technology goal: improvement on an environmentally hazardous process. The S-I
technology also suffered several setbacks due to cancellation, as the G-3 program and then the C-
5 program were cut. Again, R&D continued development of the technology in order to meet
strategic goals. There was awareness that the technology should be matured and made ready for
the next product opportunity.
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Vendor relationships can be unpredictable, but can have a significant impact on whether a
smooth transition occurs. A supplier tried to prevent adoption of the M- 1 technology by the SW
site. The supplier had invested heavily in their own process and needed to earn a return on that
investment, so they were determined to block use of an alternative to their own technology. Use
of a supplier also had an impact on the transition of M- 1 to the C-3 program. The supplier was
willing to make the switch to the new technology, but proliferation of their products throughout
the supply chain inhibited the company's ability to switch over immediately. The S-I program
faced a different supplier problem; a supplier was introduced as competition. In this case, neither
central R&D nor the supplier was able to get adequate communication from the targeted program
and both failed to meet requirements in their first attempt. The central R&D group won because
they were able to coordinate better with the program under the intense time pressure when the
initial solutions failed.
There are events that are outside the control of the research and development process, but
that does not mean that the process cannot adapt to unexpected events. Technology development
management should be aware that unexpected events will occur frequently and should look for
opportunities as they arise.
Recommendations: Link technology development to strategic goals; if target
product is cancelled the technology could still be useful. Work closely with vendors and
suppliers to collaborate on technology development. Be prepared to have faith in the
developers and have patience to wait for other opportunities. Improve the chances for
unforeseen favorable events by keeping up communication.
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7 Summary and Conclusion
The case studies discussed here are only five examples of thousands of projects that have
taken place or are currently taking place in this company. The company's R&D organization has
produced technological innovations leading to some extraordinary commercial successes. The
R&D organization is structured to support research, applied research, and development activities
that drive both incremental and radical innovation, and it is managed to support a balance of short
term and long term strategic goals. The process appears to work, but the case studies discussed
here highlight several areas that deserve more attention by R&D management:
1. The organization needs to be aware of strategic goals, be aware of the capabilities that
are available to meet them, and be able to match them to each other. This requires well
articulated strategic goals that are known throughout the organization, as well as
awareness of the available technical expertise in technology areas that are important to
those goals. Knowledge of what is available leads to good decisions about what to
develop, and also helps to inform product development about the potential timeframe for
making technology available. Decisions to outsource technological development should
be made carefully in the context of what capabilities are available within the
organization.
2. The case studies have demonstrated that both formal and informal communication are
essential to developing an understanding among customers of a technology's potential.
The R&D group should focus on engaging customers-the product business units and
external customers-as early as possible in order to generate feedback and collaboration.
Customers that provide funding will be more engaged in the development process, but
can also restrict future use of the technology. The organization should balance the
benefits of using other people's money to conduct research with the risk that their
innovation becomes other people's technology.
3. Timing of transition is critical, and often requires patience on the part of the
development team and management. Pulls for technology from organizations that are
desperate to meet an immediate technical challenge seem like a good opportunity to
transition a new technology, but can set precedents for use of the technology and affect
the reputation of the development team if the transition isn't planned carefully. Higher
risk projects should look for development projects with longer timelines so that risk can
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be reduced before adoption. The organization should also understand that transitioning a
technology that has been used many times before still requires planning, development
work, and all the attention that the first transition needed.
4. The R&D organization should note the importance of unplanned and unexpected
events to the development process. A stable system with collaboration and
communication among team members and customers can adapt to changing conditions
better than a fragmented, disconnected group.
The cases studied for this project are not necessarily representative of all activity that
takes place, but they certainly provide illustration of some of the major challenges faced by the
central R&D organization. The recommendations provided are easier said than done, but are
intended to provide attention to issues that deserve a great deal of attention in the planning and
development phase. Project definition should include attention to the goal the project is intended
to achieve, the type of innovation used to achieve that goal, recognition of the phase or maturity
of technological research in that area, and how those aspects of the project should shape the
development process and plans for communication and collaboration. This is not an exhaustive
list of the issues involved in development, but a list of issues that cannot be ignored.
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